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Many empirical studies have shown that negotiation support systems (NSS) generally 
improve negotiation performance. While most research on NSS has focused on 
functional and structural issues, the investigation of negotiator characteristics is 
largely limited. Gender has been considered as one characteristic with great direct 
relevance in the context of negotiation. This paper empirically examined the 
interaction effect of gender composition and availability of NSS. To open the ‘black 
box’ of negotiation process, we investigated the two dimensions of negotiation 
strategy: degree of cooperativeness and degree of assertiveness. The results of this 
study showed that NSS support did help negotiators to achieve higher degree of 
cooperativeness, which was a significantly positive predictor of joint outcome and 
contract balance. Degree of assertiveness was jointly influenced by gender 
composition and availability of NSS. Dyads with higher degrees of assertiveness 
achieved agreements with greater joint outcome. The differential effects of gender 
composition on these two strategic dimensions were observed. Implications of 
findings were discussed in detail. 
 
Key Words: 
Negotiation support systems (NSS), negotiation strategy, gender composition, 
negotiation process 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background and Motivation  
Negotiation is a common but challenging task in a managers’ day-to-day life. It has 
been studied from many disciplines, including sociology, psychology, political 
science, economics, applied mathematics, computer science and artificial intelligence 
(e.g., Cohen, 1991; Barry & Friedman, 1998; Lewicki et al., 2003). Bargainer 
characteristics, situational constraints and the process variables of negotiation are the 
three classes of factors that determine negotiation outcomes (Campbell et al., 1988). 
In the negotiation literature, there are two schools of studies: descriptive model 
focusing on the process of negotiation, and prescriptive model, which emphasizes on 
the outcomes of negotiation (Kersten & Cray, 1996). These two different approaches 
have different assumptions and focuses, yet complement each other. Together, they 
jointly depict a more complete picture of negotiation. 
 
With the fast development of IT technology, there is an increasing use of NSS in both 
internal and external negotiations. Recent empirical research on Negotiation Support 
Systems (NSS) has shown that computer-aided negotiations generally yielded higher 
joint outcomes (i.e., total utilities for all parties), better contract balance (fairer 
outcome), and greater satisfaction. In short, the use of NSS helps to improve 
negotiation processes and outcomes (e.g., Delaney et al., 1997; Goh et al., 2000; 
Jones, 1988; Rangaswamy & Shell, 1997). As NSS is still at its exploratory stage, 
published NSS studies mainly belong to the prescriptive model, which focuses on the 
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input and output of negotiation, and leaves the negotiation process as a black box. 
There is a lack of understanding of what happens in the negotiation process and how 
negotiation activities lead to the final outcomes, especially in computer-supported 
circumstances.  
 
Among the published NSS researches, functional models (e.g., DSS model, electronic 
communication, negotiation agents) and structural factors of negotiation (e.g., the 
amount of conflict between the negotiators, the nature of the negotiation problem) are 
the most popular areas. However, there is little work done to investigate the issues 
raised by the characteristics of negotiators in the NSS literature. To better understand 
and facilitate negotiation, the effects of individual differences have caught increasing 
attention recently (Lewicki et al., 2003; Vetschera, 2006). Despite the development of 
NSS, selecting the right people and providing appropriate training are also important 
to increase the efficiency and utility of negotiation. 
 
Some people can achieve better negotiation outcomes than others. Differences in 
gender, personalities, ability, negotiation experience, and communication style have 
been noted to impact the negotiation process and outcomes (e.g., Lewicki et al., 2003; 
Pruitt, 1981; Simintiras & Thomas, 1998; Barry & Friedman, 1998). Among these 
proposed individual differences, gender has been considered as one with greater direct 
relevance in the context of negotiation (Kray et al., 2001; Lewicki et al., 2003). A 
group of studies (Rubin & Brown, 1975; Thompson, 1990; Gayle et al., 1994; Krone 
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et al., 1994; Walters et al., 1998) have reported that men and women behaved 
differently, and consequently achieved dissimilar outcomes in negotiation. 
Consistently, the study of feminist theory also considers negotiation as a gendered 
activity (Kolb & Putman, 1997). Today’s workforce consists of a large extent of 
women. Some of them become negotiation representatives of organizations, where 
negotiation was the male-dominated job historically. Therefore, it is timely and useful 
to examine the gender effects in negotiation. 
 
1.2 Scope and Objectives  
This study aims to foster a better understanding of how gender impacts the 
negotiation process and outcomes. We propose a model to delineate the interaction 
effect of gender composition and availability of computer supports on negotiation 
process, through which influences the final negotiation outcomes. Theoretically, this 
study puts forth a NSS research model by integrating both descriptive and prescriptive 
perspectives. Practically, it could provide knowledge to managers preparing and 
carrying out successful negotiations with awareness of the potential gender effects. 
NSS developers would also further enhance the systems to better facilitate both male 
and female negotiators. Thus, the purpose of this research is twofold: (1) to determine 
the extent to which gender influences the negotiation processes and outcomes in NSS 
context, and (2) to investigate the black box of negotiation process from the 
negotiation strategy perspective.  
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1.3 Organization of Thesis 
This paper is organized as follows. The next chapter provides the literature review of 
negotiation, negotiation support systems, and the role of gender in negotiation. 
Afterwards, the research model and hypotheses are presented. In the following 
chapter, the research method is reported. In chapter 6, the data analysis of this study is 
provided. Next, findings and implications are discussed. Finally, we conclude the 
paper with a discussion of future research topics. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Three aspects that would affect the negotiation process and outcome in the research of 
NSS have been suggested: functional models (e.g., DSS model, electronic 
communication, negotiation agents), characteristics of negotiators (e.g., gender, 
ability, personality), and structural factors of negotiation (e.g., the amount of conflict 
between the negotiators, the nature of negotiation problems). In this section, the 
literature of negotiation and NSS are reviewed. Subsequently, gender effects in 
negotiation are discussed in detail. 
 
2.1 Negotiation 
2.1.1 An Overview of Negotiation Literature 
Negotiations have been studied from many perspectives including sociology, 
psychology, political science, economics, applied mathematics, computer science and 
artificial intelligence, etc (e.g., Cohen, 1991; Ikle & Leites, 1962; Pruitt, 1981). 
Gulliver defined negotiation as ‘a process in the public domain where two parties, 
with supporters of various kinds, attempt to reach a joint decision on issues in dispute’ 
(Gulliver, 1979, p. 79). It is a special form of communication that centers on 
perceived incompatibilities and focuses on reaching mutually acceptable agreements 
(Putnam & Roloff, 1992).  
 
Negotiation is a means through which two or more parties can resolve conflicts, and 
enter into agreements (Walters et al., 1998). It also concerned with how individuals 
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attempt to acquire a multitude of organizational privileges and resources, such as 
status, power, respect, and recognition (Eagly, 1995). From the perspective of social 
exchange theory, negotiation is a dynamic process characterized with information 
exchange, persuasion, and joint problem solving (Alexander et al. 1994). These 
definitions above highlight the mixed motive nature of negotiation (Hopmann, 1996), 
where negotiators maximize their and/or others’ outcomes. This encourages 
negotiators to adopt advanced technologies in a dispute resolution process. 
 
Weigand et al. (2003) summarized five basic features of negotiation: 
 There are two or more parties in a situation of some kind of interdependence,  
 Each has some individual goals which may be partially incompatible, 
 In some form of the negotiation process,  
 Alternatives are investigated,  
 Of which one is mutually agreed upon as the acceptable outcome of the process. 
 
In a negotiation process, there are four main stages (Lim, 1999), where negotiators 
have different focuses (see Figure 1). The first stage is to identify the key issues of the 
current negotiation task. In the second stage, negotiators have to estimate the range of 
each issue identified previously. Based on the outcomes generated from stage 2, 
negotiators define utility functions of theirs and estimate their opponents’ in stage 3. 
In the last stage, negotiators perform the negotiation dance. At each stage, some 
computerized tools have been proposed to assist negotiators. 
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Figure 1: Multi-Stage Model of Bilateral Negotiation (Lim, 1999) 
 
Theoretical Perspectives of Negotiation 
In the literature of negotiation studies, descriptive model and prescriptive model are 
the two major schools of approaches from various disciplines, such as sociology, 
psychology, organizational behavior, economics, etc. While descriptive model focuses 
on the process of negotiation, the prescriptive model emphasizes on the inputs and 
outputs of negotiation (Kersten & Cray, 1996). These two approaches are not 
mutually exclusive, but rather complement with each other.  
 
Descriptive model of negotiation is widely studied in social behavior science, 
sociology, and psychology. Based on sociological and psychological theories of 
learning and joint decision-making (Lim & Benbasat, 1993), the descriptive model 
seeks to describe what actually happens in the negotiation process (Weigand et al., 
2003). With descriptive approach, researchers focus on cognitive processes of 
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judgment, behavior, and outcomes in negotiation (Thompson, 1990), individual 
differences (Hausken, 1997; Ford, 1983), contextual characteristics of negotiation 
(Stuhlmacher & Champagne, 2000), and situational determinants (Pruitt & Rubin, 
1986a, b), etc.  
 
Prescriptive model of negotiation stems from the studies of Game Theory, social 
psychology and organizational behavior. Its fundamental assumption is axiomatic 
rationality, where participants will always choose the options that are in their best 
interests according to the particular quality measurement instrument chosen. It is 
normative in the sense that it prescribes what negotiators should do to achieve the 
desired results (Weigand et al., 2003). While the theoretical objective of this 
perspective is to predict the processes and outcomes of negotiation, the practical goal 
is to help people negotiate more effectively (Raiffa, 1982). This approach is often 
being criticized as too general or hypothetical, over-simplified, as it ignores the 
process of negotiation and focus on outcomes. However, at the exploration stage of a 
new phenomenon, this approach would be more effective in facilitating research by 
simplifying the problem.  
 
2.1.2 Negotiator Characteristics 
Almost every negotiation involves people, thus it is essential to understand the 
negotiator characteristics in the study of NSS. In the negotiation literature, gender 
(Rubin & Brown, 1975; King & Hinson, 1994), personalities (Ford, 1983), 
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negotiation experience (Neale & Northcaft, 1991), communication style (Simintiras & 
Thomas, 1998) have been noted to impact the negotiation process and outcomes 
(Barry & Friedman, 1998; Lewicki et al., 2003; Pruitt, 1981). In this paper, we focus 
on gender. 
 
Gender has caught researchers’ attention in the negotiation research (Rubin & Brown, 
1975; Thompson, 1990). It is considered as ‘one of the most important demographic 
variables to investigate in a setting like negotiation where the situational pressures are 
more apt to prompt behaviors consistent with gender roles’ (King & Hinson, 1994, 
p610). In general, women are more cooperative; while men are more competitive in 
conflicts (Gayle et al., 1994; Krone et al., 1994; Walters et al., 1998). In the third part 
of this chapter, gender will be discussed in detail. 
 
2.1.3 Negotiation Process 
Negotiation process involves interaction process among parties and cognitive process 
within each individual before reaching agreements. The interaction process consists of 
communication among all participants, and behavioral enactments and executions of 
negotiation strategies (Walton, 1987; Thompson, 1990). Through these activities, they 
attempt to justify their positions and persuade opponents. The cognitive process 
covers negotiation planning, information processing and affect (Neale & Northcraft, 
1991). In short, the final agreement is jointly determined by conflict management 
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behavior and negotiator cognition of each party (Walton, 1987). The paper mainly 
studies the interaction process, specifically, negotiation strategy and communication. 
 
2.1.3.1 Negotiation Strategies  
In negotiation, strategies govern an entire or a large part of the interaction. In game 
theory domain, researchers usually try to determine the optimal strategy to reach 
equilibrium. However, when it is not possible to get this optimal strategy due to 
human limitation or resource constraints, negotiators may tend to use heuristics. Some 
factors that may affect the choice of strategies have been proposed, such as negotiator 
personalities, negotiation goals, and counterparty behaviors, etc. The most common 
negotiation strategies identified include problem solving, yielding, contending and 
avoiding (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986a; Pruitt, 2001). In the following part, these strategies 
are discussed by incorporating the notion of Dual Concern Model (Pruitt, 1983; Pruitt 
& Rubin, 1986a). 
Table 1: The Dual Concern Model: Strategy and Joint Outcome 
High self concern Low self concern  


















Dual Concern Model 
It has been suggested that it would be more accurate to describe conflict-handling 
behaviors by two dimensions: assertiveness and cooperativeness (Thomas & Kilmann, 
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1974; Ruble & Thomas, 1976; Thomas, 1976). The Dual Concern Model (see Table 1) 
predicts negotiation outcomes as a function of a negotiator's concern of self profits 




An individual is considered using problem solving strategy, if he/she is assertive as 
well as cooperative in negotiation. The problem solving conflict-handling style has 
also been called as collaborative (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986) or integrative bargaining 
(Walton & McKersie, 1965). The Dual Concern Model suggests that successful 
integrative bargaining would be achieved by problem solving strategy, where 
individuals tend to ‘expand the pie’ by looking for solutions. As a consequence, the 
final agreement is likely to satisfy both parties, such that high joint outcomes could be 
reached. However, negotiators may fail to maintain a high concern for both parties in 
real practices.  
 
When it is difficult to yield and contending seems infeasible or unwise, problem 
solving strategy is likely to be adopted (Zartman, 2000). This strategy is more feasible 
when the negotiation task has a high integrative potential. Pruitt (2001) summarized 
the sources of perceived integrative potential: (1) faith in one’s own problem-solving 
ability, (2) recent success in reaching agreement, (3) the presence of a mediator, (4) 
the other party’s perceived readiness to change position, (5) trust in the other party is 
interested in problem solving and will abstain from taking competitive advantage of 
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the negotiator. In addition, a good working relationship would also encourage the 
adoption of problem solving strategy to increase the achievement of mutually 
beneficial agreement and prosper future interaction.  
 
Yielding  
When individuals behave cooperatively and unassertively in a negotiation, they are 
applying the yielding strategy. It is characterized by a self-sacrificial deference to the 
other party’s needs (Walters et al., 1998). Yielding or accommodating may imply a 
partial concession (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986), and reducing one’s aspiration (Ben-Yoav & 
Pruitt, 1984b). With yielding strategy, individuals’ own concerns are unlikely to be 
fully addressed. Instead, they will take away ‘influence, respect, and recognition 
(Thomas & Kilmann, 1974, p. 16). Both problem solving and yielding improve the 
chances of reaching agreement but with different cost. The former strategy is for the 
benefit of both parties and the latter is at one’s own expense (Pruitt, 2001). 
 
According to the Dual Concern Model, yielding strategy is likely to be used, if the 
negotiator focuses on the opponent’s interests with very limited self-concern. Such a 
strong other-concern would emerge when individuals are motivated to cooperate, or 
have a positive mode, or expected a good future relationship in long run, or they have 
good relationships with the opponent, or under time pressure (Pruitt, 2001). As a 
result, they may miss the possibility of an integrative solution. Besides, their 
aspiration may collapse easily, which leads to low joint outcomes. It is unlikely to use 
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this strategy, when there are some important issues derived from more basic concerns, 
such as basic rights, self-esteem, ethical principle, etc. It is so hard to yield, if one’s 
aspirations are close to his/her lower limit (Pruitt, 1981), or being hostile towards the 
other party (Zubek et al., 1992). Besides, from agency theory perspective, it is more 
difficult to yield if the negotiator is a representative rather than on one’s own behalf 
(Benton & Druckman, 1973).  
 
Contending 
Negotiators with contending strategies tend to use threats, counter threats, arguments 
for persuading concession, and positional commitments (Pruitt, 2001). According to 
the Dual Concern Model, contending behavior results when an individual is highly 
assertive and uncooperative. This type of behavior is considered as power-oriented, 
where individuals are highly motivated to win or defeat their opponents (Thomas & 
Kilmann, 1974). It is also known as claiming value. With the contending strategy, 
negotiators can achieve joint outcomes at a moderate level (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986a; 
Calhoun & Smith, 1999). The negotiators’ aim is the ultimate criterion to distinguish 
between problem solving and contending (Pruitt, 2001). 
 
It is more likely for negotiators to use contending strategy, when there is high 
accountability to constituents (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984b), or when it is observed by 
male constituents (Pruitt et al., 1986), or when one views the situation as “win-lose”. 
Besides, great threats from the opponent would possibly stimulate the negotiator to be 
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contentious as well. Many studies have found that there is a high probability that both 
parties in the negotiation use contentious strategies. Carnevale and Isen (1986) 
suggested putting a barrier between the two negotiators to reduce the use of 




The last type of negotiation strategy identified by this model is avoiding, where a 
negotiator is neither cooperative nor assertive. In such a case, the individual is 
considered as inactive, or has withdrawn from the issue. Thus, the joint outcome is 
low.  
 
In summary, the Dual Concern Model explicitly assumes that the other-concern 
dimension and self-concern dimension are independent. Factors affecting one 
dimension may not necessarily have impacts on the other. Several studies have 
provided supportive evidence of this assumption (e.g., Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984a, 
1984b; Carnevale & Lawler, 1986). Unlike economic models of negotiation assuming 
that negotiators are rational and maintain a relative high degree of assertiveness and 
cooperativeness, the Dual Concern Model posits negotiators differ in their level of 
other-concern and self-concern. 
 
2.1.3.2 Communication 
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Negotiation after all is a special kind of communication between two or more parties 
to reach an agreement (Kimmel et al., 1980；Putnam & Roloff, 1992). It is a dynamic 
process characterized by information exchange, persuasion, and joint problem solving 
(Alexander et al., 1994). Research in social psychology and economics found that 
negotiators systematically reach better outcomes than normative economic predictions, 
if communication is allowed (Orbell et al., 1988; Sally, 1995). 
  
Communication in negotiation serves four primary functions (Tutzauer & Roloff, 
1988): (1) a vehicle for transmitting and accepting offers, (2) a means for conveying 
information, (3) a mechanism for shaping the relationship between the bargainers 
through argumentations, and (4) a lens for uncovering outcomes. The mode of 
communication would affect both the efficiency of outcomes and the distribution of 
available surplus (Valley et al., 1998). A series of studies conducted by Burgoon and 
his colleagues (Burgoon et al., 1984; Burgoon & Hale, 1984, 1987; Burgoon & 
Newton, 1991) have identified some dimensions of communication: intimacy, 
composure or relaxation, formality, dominance or inequality, and task-social 
orientation. 
 
Neale and Northcraft (1991) summarized that research on communication in 
negotiation has followed two lines: (1) the effects of communication on outcomes, 
specifically the content and style, (2) the determinants of communication tactical 
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choices. For instance, investigating the effects of the electronic communication 
channel in NSS is one of the research areas (Lim & Yang, 2004; 2005).  
 
Social presence theory, media richness theory and social information processing 
theory are the most popular theories developed and examined in communication 
research. Social presence theory (Short et al., 1976) has been frequently applied in the 
study of computer mediated communication (CMC). Social presence refers to one’s 
feeling of the involvement of the other persons in a communication exchange. 
Communication medium affects the perception of warmth and friendliness in an 
interaction. This theory states that the higher the bandwidth of the communication 
media, the greater the social presence of communicators. However, it is challenged 
that it is the time limitations rather than bandwidth that hinder relationship building 
through CMC. Originated in study on information processing, media richness theory 
(Daft & Lengel, 1984; 1986) focuses on the number of cues available in different 
media. It posits that there is an optimal match between the equivocality of 
communication tasks and the selection of communication media. Richness refers to 
the ability of each medium to convey messages (Daft et al., 1987). Explicitly rejecting 
the notion that the absence of nonverbal cues limits relational communication, social 
information processing theory (Walther, 1992) explains and predicts participants’ 
interpersonal accommodation via CMC and face-to-face (FtF) channels. Social 
information processing refers to ‘the way by which communicator’s process social 
identity and relational cues using different media’ (Walther, 1994, p.190). This theory 
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posits that social information is exchanged through the content, style and timing of 
verbal message online, where time is a critical factor. Particularly, the perceived 
differences in immediacy, composure, and receptivity between CMC and face-to-face 
settings would be reduced over time.  
 
2.1.4 Situational Factors 
2.1.4.1 Bargaining Orientation 
Bargaining situations of negotiations vary along the continuum between integrative 
and distributive. Distributive negotiation is generally known as “win-lose”, “slicing 
the pie” and “competitive” (Schelling, 1956). Negotiators aim to maximize their 
individual outcomes. In this situation, negotiators focus on sub-optimal outcomes to 
claim value, and try to achieve an efficient compromise (Kersten, 2001).  
 
In contrast, integrative negotiation is known as “win-win” and “expanding the pie”. It 
provides an opportunity for the parties involved to integrate their interests (Thompson, 
1998) to create a solution that satisfies both parties. Walton and McKersie (1965) 
noted the most important conditions leading to integrative agreement in negotiations 
are simultaneous considerations of issues where mutual trade-off can be made, 
problem-solving orientation, free and accurate information exchange, avoidance of 
distributive behavior, and high aspiration in the negotiation process. 
 
2.1.4.2 Severity of Time Pressure 
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Nearly every negotiation is conducted under certain time limitation explicitly or 
implicitly. Time pressure is defined as either relatively short (high pressure) or long 
(low pressure) for the time given in a negotiation. Time limitation may influence 
people’s behaviors (Druskat & Kayes, 2000). Pruitt and Drews (1969) argued that 
negotiation could be more effective with time pressure, as it could increase the 
importance of reaching an agreement, reduce the number of options, and provide the 
negotiators a concession rationale. Consistently, Stuhlmacher and Champagne (2000) 
summarized three types of response processes in negotiation under high time pressure. 
First, strong time pressures in the form of fixed deadlines would accelerate the 
process toward agreement (Druckman, 1994; Maule & Mackie, 1990). A 
meta-analytical study (Druckman, 1994) showed that negotiators yielded more under 
high time pressure. Second, negotiators may process information selectively (e.g., 
being risk aversive) with time pressure (Svenson & Edland, 1987). Third, differential 
combination of information would be generated as well (Edland & Svenson, 1993).  
 
Empirical studies showed that high time pressure might also promote cooperative 
behavior (Carnevale & Lawler, 1986), and sponsor agreement rather than impasses 
(Stuhlmacher et al., 1998). However, suggested by Stuhlmacher and Champagne 
(2000), at early stage of a negotiation, high time pressure might not affect the strategy 
choices. Adjustments are likely being made more frequently as getting close to the 
deadline. Their study also showed that under time pressure decisions could be 
consistent, but the quality of agreements might vary.  
 - 19 -
2.1.4.3 Third Party Intervention 
The availability of third party may influence the negotiation process and outcome 
(Wall & Blum, 1991). This effect would vary with the roles of third parties as well as 
their behavior. In most of the cases, the third parties would assist the negotiators to 
achieve agreement by reducing the level of conflict. However, they may also have 
their own objectives (Zartman & Touval, 1985).  
 
According to Fisher (1990), third parties can be classified into four basic types: 
mediator, arbitrator, conciliator and consultant. Mediator is a neutral party facilitating 
the negotiation solution by using reasoning, persuasion, control of information, 
providing alternative suggestions. Arbitrator refers to a third party with authority to 
dictate an agreement. Conciliator refers to a third party who provides an informal 
communication channel between the negotiation parties. Conciliator requires to be 
trusted by both sides. Consultant refers to a third party who is skillful and attempts to 
facilitate problem solving through communication and analysis. Currently, the study 
of third party is still at exploration stage, and mainly limited in the forms of mediator 
and arbitrator.  
 
2.1.4.4 Negotiator Relationships 
Negotiation is a process to resolve conflicts in the context of ongoing relations. 
Different types of relationships among negotiators, such as strangers, friends, lovers, 
would affect their perception and behavior (Barry & Oliver, 1996). Recently, many 
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researchers have conducted studies focusing on some particular types of relationships 
in negotiation (e.g., Barry & Oliver, 1996; Drolet et al., 1998). Having a good 
relationship with their opponent, negotiators may be willing to sacrifice some of their 
own outcome for the benefit of their relationship. With a negative relationship, 
negotiators may behave more ambitious to maximize their own benefit (Druckman & 
Broome, 1991). 
 
2.2 Negotiation Support Systems (NSS) 
NSS, a special type of Group Support Systems (GSS), support negotiators to reach an 
agreement. Since 1960s, when computer models were first employed to support 
individual in a negotiation, interest in NSS research has been growing in seeking 
better ways to use computer technology and information systems in negotiation. In 
early 1980s, researchers started developing NSS intended to support negotiation 
parties (DeSanctis & Gallupe, 1987). Table 2 summarizes the NSS applications 
developed in recent years. These NSS prototypes range from no computer mediation 
assistance at all to fully automated computer agents. Essentially, these applications 
differ in the way negotiators' private preferences are utilized and the degree of NSS 
influence on the negotiation. However, most of these NSS applications are still at the 
exploration stage with limited adoption in real practice.  
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Table 2: NSS Prototypes 
System Name Type of Support System Input Interaction Developer/Reference System Status 
CAP Decision Support for Mediator or 
Arbitrator 
Mediator Fraser and Hipple, 1981 N.A. 
Computer Decision Tree 
Model 
Decision Support: pre-negotiation 
strategy formulation 
Single party Winter, 1987 Single real-life 
application 








GENIE Decision Support for Negotiator Single party Wilkenfeld et al. 1995 N.A. 
INSPIRE 
 
First system designed to conduct 
negotiations on Web. 
Used in negotiation teaching and 
training as well as in the design of 
NSS 
Single or Multiple negotiators InterNeg 1996 
Kersten & Noronha, 
1999 
Prototype 
Used for Teaching and 
Training 
Mediator Cooperative GDSS 
Evaluation and selection of 
alternatives 
Group of individuals and a 
mediator 
Jarke, Jelassi, and 





Single or Multiple negotiators Kersten, 1985 Prototype 




individuals and a 
mediator 
Espinasse, Picolet, and 
Chouraqui, 1997 
N.A. 
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NEGOTEX Decision Support for Negotiator Single party Rangaswamy et al., 
1989 
N.A. 
Negotiation Assistant NSS Two parties Rangaswamy and Shell, 
1997 
N.A. 
Persuader Decision Support for Mediator or 
Arbitrator 
Mediator Sycara, 1990 N.A. 




ProNeg NSS Two parties Foroughi et al., 1995; 
Perkins et al., 1996; 
Delaney et al., 1997 
Prototype in testing 
RUNE Pre-negotiation strategy formulation  Single party or chauffeur Kersten et al., 1986 Prototype in testing 
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2.2.1 Motivation of Developing NSS 
The objective of NSS is to help negotiating parties reach a better agreement. NSS can 
be used in preparing for negotiation, assessing negotiators’ own and the opposite 
party’s positions and interests, and suggesting better alternative solutions (Kersten & 
Noronha, 1999). In the NSS literature, two major motivations of developing NSS 
have been identified (Rangaswamy & Starke, 2000): (1) to improve the process and 
outcomes of negotiations through latest technology applications, and (2) to overcome 
the limitations of traditional face-to-face negotiations with computer support.  
 
In addition to the complexity of negotiation itself, to identify and achieve optimal 
outcomes may also be hindered by negotiators’ limited information processing 
capacity and capability, cognitive biases, and socio-emotional obstacles (Bazerman et 
al., 1985; Foroughi et al, 1995). The challenges of negotiation and the cognitive 
limitations of human negotiators have led researchers to pursue computer support in 
the form of Negotiation Support Systems (Goh et al., 2000). There are several 
limitations of face-to-face negotiations (see table 3) hindering the achievement of 
optimal agreements (Foroughui et al., 1995). To reduce these barriers, some 
principles are proposed to structure the negotiation process (Fisher & Ury, 1983). 
Firstly, separate the people from the problem. Secondly, identify and focus on 
negotiators’ interests. Thirdly, generate options for mutual gain. Fourthly, use 
objective criteria and data. These principles would contribute significantly in the 
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development of NSS to impose formal negotiation structures and complement 
negotiator cognitive bias and limitations.  
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Table 3: Major Stumbling Blocks of Human Negotiator and Predicted NSS Solutions (Adapted from Foroughui et al., 1995) 
 Major Stumbling Blocks Possible Solutions NSS Solution (Predicted) Measure 
I. Cognitive 
Limitations 
The cognitive difficulty of evaluating 
the utility of alternative settlements and 
determining trade-offs (Lewicki & 
Litterer, 1985) 
Analytical processing of subjective 
preference and/or external objective 
data and identification of high joint 
benefit solutions or strategies (Jelassi 
& Foroughi, 1989) 
DSS support for alternative generation 
and evaluation (Anson & Jelassi, 1990; 








A. Consideration of issues in isolation 
The failure to integrate single issues 
into a single package so that potential 
trade-offs can be recognized (Kelly, 
1966; Erickson et al., 1974) 
Display of entire contract for 
discussion to enable "logrolling" 
among issues (Jelassi & Jones, 1988) 
DSS will encourage simultaneous issue 
consideration, which helps to achieve 




 B. Negative framing of the negotiation 
Evaluation of potential losses instead of 
potential gains, which can lead to 
risk-seeking behavior (Tversky & 
Kahnemen, 1981; Bazerman & Neale, 
1983) 
Establishment of interaction rules and 
use of pre-negotiation modules 
requiring parties to identify their 
interests (Anson & Jelassi, 1990) 
DSS support will give bargainers more 
confidence of getting a fair, satisfactory 
outcome (Anson & Jelassi, 1990; 





 C. Fixed-pie mentality 
The assumption that their interests are 
in direct conflict with the other party, 
and that one side will win at the 
expense of the other (Pruitt, 1983) 
Public display of conflicting views, 
pairing of related items (Anson & 
Jelassi, 1990), analytical methods to 
identify alternative solutions. 
Structured integrative bargaining 
process will encourage bargainers to 
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 D. Premature closure or finalizing of 
positions  
Tendency to prematurely finalize 
positions before considering all possible 
solution alternatives (Kelley, 1966) 
Presentation of a negotiation text 
(Fisher, 1978) of equivalent value to 
both sides as a starting point, rules 
requiring consideration of all issues 
(Jelassi & Jones, 1988) 
DSS support ensures that bargainers 
find a good, integrative solution before 
closure (Anson & Jelassi, 1990) 
Joint 
outcome 
 E. Preference for available, salient 
information or solutions 
Tendency to recall and value most that 
information which is most salient or 
familiar (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) 
Rules requiring consider action of all 
issues (Jelassi & Jones, 1988), NSS 
suggestions of possible concessions, 
solutions, and trade-offs (Jelassi & 
Foroughi, 1989) 
DSS simplifies alternative evaluation, 
thus ensuring considering of multiple 








A. Face-saving behavior 
Avoidance of agreements in which they 
feel they are giving in (Hitrop and 
Rubin, 1981) 
Suggestions of possible concessions 
to help achieve optimal joint 
outcomes and permit negotiators to 
compromise while still saving face 
(Anson & Jelassi, 1990) 
NSS support helps bargainers find an 
agreement which is good for both of 
them and will not make them lose face 
(Anson & Jelassi, 1990; Foroughi & 
Jelassi, 1989) 
Satisfaction 
 B. Ineffective communication 
Distraction due to physical appearance 
of opposing parties, semantic 
differences, and status and power 
differences (Lewicki & Litterer, 1985) 
Participation rules, display of 
organized feedback (DeSanctis & 
Gallupe, 1987), written wording to 
focus group attention, encourage 
preciseness, and document the 
agreement (Jarke & Jelassi, 1986) 
Electronic communication provides an 
extra channel of communication, 
encourages bargainers to clarify 
thoughts before inputting (Jarke & 
Jelassi, 1986), reduces personality 
conflicts (DeSanctis & Gallup 1987; 
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 C. Negotiator overconfidence  
Overrating of their own judgments 
(Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978), belief that 
neutral parties will judge in their favor 
(Farber, 1981) 
Sense of rationality brought by 
analytical processing of subjective 
preference and/or external objective 
data and the determination of possible 
solutions (DeSanctis & Gallupe, 
1987) 
DSS support for alternative evaluation 
will bring a sense of rationality which 
encourages objective, realistic 






 D. Nonrational escalation of conflict 
Tendency to escalate the level of 
conflict irrationally (Lewicki & Litterer, 
1985), "locking in" on hostile opening 
moves (Pilisuk & Skolnick, 1978) 
Focus of attention away from 
personalities and on issues resulting 
from use of electronic communication 
(DeSanctis & Gallupe, 1987), 
participation rules (Anson & Jelassi, 
1990) 
Electronic communication will 
depersonalize the atmosphere, so the 
bargainers can focus on issues instead 
of personalities (DeSanctis & Gallupe, 
1987; Lim and Benbasat, 1992; 
Sheffield, 1992), and will deescalate 
conflict by increasing confidence in 
achieving a good agreement (Anson & 
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2.2.2 Components of NSS 
Conceptually, NSS consist of two components (Lim & Benbasat, 1993): Decision 
Support System (DSS) component which relates to game theory and economic theory, 
and electronic communication component which references social-psychological 
theory (see Figure 2). This theoretical model pertains to a two-person, 
session-oriented, multiple-issue setting. The use of the DSS would help to refine the 
negotiator objectives, and enhance their capability and capacity of information 
processing and analyzing complex problems. Thus, negotiators with DSS support 
would be more confident, such that more efficient and balanced outcomes might be 
achieved.  
 
Communication media would affect the way information is processed (Valley et al., 
1994). The use of electronic communication channel can help to increase the level of 
perceived commitment and trust in the other party. As a consequence, agreements 
may be reached in a faster and more satisfied manner. In NSS facilitated negotiation 
context, different communication media, such as visual and audio channels, are 
proposed to enable the subjects to make use of social cues to support the 
communication process (Lim & Yang, 2004). 
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Figure 2: The Theoretical Model of NSS 
 
In line with the Lim and Benbasat (1993) proposed model, a number of empirical 
studies have provided supportive evidences. Generally, they demonstrated that 
traditional NSS can effectively help human negotiators achieve higher joint outcomes 
and more balanced contracts over unsupported face-to-face negotiations (e.g., 
Delaney et al., 1997; Goh et al., 2000; Lim & Yang, 2004). It has been shown that 
DSS-only support could generate similar results to the comprehensive NSS in 
improving joint outcomes, contract balance, and number of contract proposals 
(Delaney et al., 1997). Lim and Yang (2005) examined the effects of 
e-communication component with variant communication supports in negotiation. 
The empirical results showed that negotiation dyads with videoconferencing-enabled 
NSS-support would achieve higher joint outcome, but spend longer time in reaching 
agreements in low conflict negotiation situations (Lim & Yang, 2004). Moreover, 
NSS with a multilingual-supported communication channel would improve contract 
balance, but the time taken was significantly longer (Lim & Yang, 2005). The study 










Capacity and Capability 
  Outcome Group 1 
1. Time to Settlement 
2. Satisfaction 
 
  Outcome Group 2 
3. Distance from Efficient Frontier 
4. Distance from Nash Solution 
5. Confidence with Solution 
Negotiation Outcomes
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However, while some studies (e.g., Delaney et al., 1997; Yuan et al., 2003) found that 
the addition of an electronic communication channel led to a significant increase in 
satisfaction, Rangaswamy and Shell (1997) found no significant differences in 
satisfaction levels among NSS, DSS and face-to-face conditions. This may be due to 
the differences in experiment design and individual experience with NSS or 
negotiation tasks (Rangaswamy & Starke, 2000). Thus, more systematic future 
research is needed. Lim and Benbasat’s (1993) theoretical model is the first step in 
NSS theory development. However, it is not conclusive. The addition of human 
factors, task characteristics, and their interplay with the system might provide a more 
complete and in-depth framework. 
 
2.2.3 Classification of NSS 
Based on fundamental differences in NSS design and functionality, Rangaswamy and 
Starke (2000) classified NSS applications into two categories: (1) preparation and 
evaluation systems, (2) process support systems. Preparation and evaluation systems 
provide negotiation decision support before or during a negotiation. Process support 
systems function as electronic “bargaining tables” by providing the negotiators with 
the means to communicate with each other. In some cases, they assume a more active 
role by providing computer mediation or arbitration mechanisms.  
 
According to the functions, NSS can be considered to have two subcomponents (Lim 
& Benbasat, 1993): Decision Support System (DSS) component and electronic 
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communication component. A number of decision-aiding techniques such as the 
following could be employed by the DSS component (Rangaswamy & Starke, 2000): 
information control component (storage and retrieval of data), representational aids, 
decision aiding techniques and models, judgment refinement/amplification techniques, 
and inference capabilities (e.g., process model, choice model, analysis and reasoning). 
The electronic communication component ranges from e-mail, text-chatting room to 
high quality video conferencing (Lim & Yang, 2005).  
 
In addition to the traditional NSS mentioned above, with recent advances in IT, the 
autonomous negotiation agent is getting popular (Beam & Segev, 1997). Instead of 
performing negotiation task by human negotiators, negotiation agent could prepare 
and negotiate on behalf of their human “clients”, especially for well-structured 
negotiation tasks. Governed by computational rules (Goh et al., 2000), these agents 
may include a concession model with general strategies of concession in 
multiple-issue negotiations (e.g., Matwin et al., 1991), a case-based reasoning to plan 
and support of negotiations (e.g., Sycara, 1990), and a genetic algorithm-based 
learning technique (e.g., Oliver, 1997). Negotiation agent can bring significant 
benefits, such as time saving, avoiding unnecessary cognitive limitation/bias, 
lowering transaction cost, and increasing the efficiency of settlements (Oliver, 1997; 
Rangaswamy & Starke, 2000). As it is still at the exploration stage, future research is 
needed in areas of developing ontology and strategy (Beam & Segev, 1997), setting 
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up an infrastructure (Lo & Kersten, 1999), and building negotiation protocols (Yuan 
et al., 2003). 
 
2.2.4 Empirical Research on NSS 
2.2.4.1 Case Study 
The case study methodology, which enables researchers to have a more thorough 
view of a new phenomenon, is an appropriate approach to study the emerging 
applications (Yin, 2003). Some case studies of NSS have been conducted to describe 
NSS applications in real practice. For example, Nyhart and Goeltner (1987) studied 
the use of computer models in U.S. government agency negotiations. 
Labor-management contract negotiations were studied in an electronic meeting room 
setting (Carmel et al., 1993). The users generally felt that this software led to less 
language ambiguities and misunderstandings, more trust, fewer note taking and typing. 
The software also helped them to track the progress and status of negotiations more 
accurately.  
 
There are relatively few published case studies of NSS, especially for full-featured 
NSS. Unfortunately, these case studies failed to provide sufficient detail, and led to 
the difficulty of knowledge accumulation in this area. Most of the studies 
demonstrated limited generalizability, as they described different systems, settings 
and tasks (Foroughi et al., 1995). When the study claimed the negotiation was 
successful, it was difficult to attribute this success to the systems, settings, or other 
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possible factors. Therefore, more systematic and comprehensive case studies are 
needed to provide better understanding of NSS in field. 
 
2.2.4.2 Laboratory Experiments 
As NSS are still at its exploration stage, most studies of NSS are conducted by 
employing laboratory experiments. Table 4 provides an overview of the recent 
experimental studies in NSS. Some factors that influence the outcome have been 
suggested, such as conflict level (e.g., Jone, 1988; Foroughi et al., 1995; Perkins et al., 
1996; Delaney et al., 1997), richness of communication media (e.g., Sainfort et al., 
1990; Yuan et al., 2003; Lim & Yang, 2004), the degree of NSS support (e.g., 
Eliasberg et al., 1992; Rangaswamy & Shell, 1997), etc.  
 
Most of these published empirical studies focus on the input and output of negotiation. 
Generally, two groups of outcomes are measured in NSS research: contract related 
outcomes and process related outcomes. However, the empirical findings about the 
relationships between NSS and negotiation outcomes are not consistent. This 
inconsistency may be due to the experiments being different in negotiation task, 
system used, experiment procedures, subjects of the experiment, measure of the 
outcome, and other possible confounding factors, etc.  
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Table 4: Experimental Studies of NSS in Literature 
Study Study Design and 
Negotiation Task 
Type of NSS support Measure Main Findings 
Jones (1988) No-DSS and DSS 
negotiation (Face-to-Face 
negotiations: computer 
suggestions vs. no support) 
in high/low conflict 
condition; bilateral, four issue 
manufacturing bargaining 
task 
Limited NSS (To facilitate 
mediation, the 
experimenter presents the 
highest joint outcome 




In the low conflict condition, NSS suggestions that 
indicated contracts which maximized joint utility led to 
higher joint outcomes but required more time. In high 
conflict situations, negotiators perceived the climate to be 






DSS, No-NSS (Video), NSS; 
Various real-life interpersonal 
problems; 
Subjects: couples involved in 
dyadic problems 
DSS process support for 
different steps of a 
structured negotiation 
process including database 
access and alternative 
evaluation; Video of how 




DSS led to a higher number of alternatives generated than 
Video and greater perceived progress in resolution of the 
problem a month later. 
DSS and Video performed no differently (but better than 
control) on perceived problem understanding and decrease 
in level of frustration with problem. No effect of DSS or 
Video on the quality of alternatives generated. 






DSS, No-DSS (reading 
material), No-DSS (Prior 
course in negotiation) 
Expert system that 
provides a customized 
checklist of tips and 
guidelines to American 
negotiators preparing to 




A course in negotiation had the greatest impact on 
performance on profits realized and on settlements being 
close to the pareto frontier. The use of the NEGOTEX 
system had the next higher impact on performance, 
followed by the reading material. The effects of the 
decision aids were additive, i.e., multiple forms of training 






No-NSS and DSS; 
Hostage crisis with three 
parties, where one party 
(role) used DSS. 
DSS (GENIE – Multi- 
Attribute Utility (MAU) 
model plus expert 
knowledge base used for 




DSS users were found to give more importance to the 
objective of maximizing utility than non-users. DSS users 
tend to achieve higher individual utility scores, higher joint 
utility scores, and were more likely to achieve an agreement 






No-NSS and NSS 
negotiations in high/low 
conflict condition; 
 
Task same as Jones (1988) 
NSS: DSS for contract 
generation and 






NSS supported dyads achieved higher joint outcomes, 
higher contract balance, greater satisfaction for high and 
low conflict, but longer negotiation time. There was no 
significant difference in the number of contract proposals 
and in the perception of collaboration climate. The NSS 
support led to a lower negative climate in the low-conflict 
condition. 
 






No-NSS and DSS under 
high/low conflict; 
task same as above 
 
Subjects: Managers 
DSS for contract 
generation and 
evaluation (same DSS as 





DSS users achieved higher joint outcomes and contract 
balance in both conflict conditions. Interestingly, managers 
with DSS needed significantly less negotiation time than 
managers without support. In the low conflict condition, 
DSS users proposed fewer contracts than non-NSS users. 






No-NSS, DSS alone, NSS 
(DSS plus electronic 
communication) in 
high/low conflict condition; 
Task same as Jones (1988) 
NSS: Interface and 
communication 
component and DSS for 
contract generation and 
evaluation (same NSS as 
Foroughi et al. 1995) 
Input/ 
Output 
Follow-up to Foroughi et al (1995) study: The DSS 
component alone led to higher joint outcomes, more 
balanced contracts (i.e., significant difference to No-DSS, 
no difference to NSS), and longer negotiation time. DSS 
users exchanged more offers than full NSS users and 
no-NSS users. NSS dyads reported greater satisfaction than 
the DSS only and no-NSS dyads, i.e., the electronic 
communication component positively influenced 
satisfaction for both conflict levels. There was no 
difference across all cells in perceived collaborative 
climate and perceived negative climate. 
 




No-NSS, (face to face), email,











NSS dyads achieved better outcomes than face-to-face or 
email dyads (there was no difference between dyads in 
email and face-to-face conditions). NSS/DSS subjects spent 
more time than no-NSS/e-mail users to prepare for the 
negotiation. NSS dyads performed better performers than 
those with DSS only. There were some differences in 
perceptions among the test conditions, including: 1. The 
negotiation process was perceived as friendlier for the 
dyads negotiating face-to-face (i.e., DSS and No-NSS), 2. 
DSS supported dyads (i.e., NSS and DSS) reported more 
honesty in communication with the other party. 3 There 
were also a few marginally significant differences: No-NSS 
dyads in the face-to-face condition (and to lesser extent, the 
DSS dyads) least felt that they drove a hard bargain and 
that they were in control during the negotiation. Dyads 
communicating electronically (i.e., NSS and email) failed 
to reach an agreement in a few cases, whereas all 
face-to-face dyads reached agreements. 
 
Goh, Teo, Wu, 




bargaining agents (EBA) in 
high/low conflict condition 
Task: adapted from Jone’s 
study 
NSS: a text-based, 
electronic messaging 
facility, an alternative 
evaluator, and an 
alternative generator. 
EBA: an agent tailor and 
an event viewer 
Input/ 
Output 
Web-based NSS can significantly improve efficiency and 
fairness in remote integrative negotiations but not in 
distributive negotiations. EBA were found to achieve 
outcomes comparable to but not significantly better than 
unassisted human dyads. 







Task: the discussion and 








The breadth of asynchronous discussions is higher than the 
number of ideas mentioned face-to-face. 
 
Broader discussions translated into more complete reports 
for asynchronous groups, the ability to pool more 
information along with the ease of compiling individual 
contributions from the written transcripts led to longer 
reports for asynchronous groups. 
 
In terms of coordination, face-to-face teams covered the 
case study questions sequentially, while asynchronous 
groups were more focused on solving their general 
disagreements. 
Yuan, Head, 
and Du (2003) 
Text only, Text with Audio, 
Text with Audio and Video 








Two rounds (same role, 
different partners and tools) 
Web-based NSS, with 
three types of 
communication tools 
(Text, text and Audio, text 
and audio and video) on 





Both text with audio and text with audio and video 
communication were significantly preferred to text alone. 
However, the addition of video to text and audio 
communication in a negotiation environment was not 
found to be beneficial. It did not significantly improve 
communication efficiency, effectiveness or positive 
social-emotional communication, but distracted negotiators 
from focusing on the negotiation task.  
Also revealed that the communication efficiency construct 
did not correlate with the perceived success of the 
negotiation solution communication effectiveness and 
social-emotional communication did correlate with 
negotiation satisfaction. 




Info. Collective Vs. individual
Various real-life business 
issues surrounding spatial 




Two kinds of NSS: one 
presents information 




Shared identity and shared cognition are relatively powerful 
predictors of outcomes of international negotiations, and 
that minimal variations in the configuration of an NSS can 
have strong effects on these results. It appears that shared 
cognition should be not just about problems facing the 
negotiators but also about the possibilities for solutions and 
common ground 
Lim and Yang 
(2004) 
VC only vs. NSS (VC + DSS) 
in high/low conflicts  
 
Task: adapted from Jones’ 
study (1988)  
Videoconferencing-based 




Dyads with videoconferencing NSS support achieved 
higher joint outcome, but spent more time in reaching 
agreements - in low but not high conflict negotiation 
situation. 
Lim and Yang 
(2005) 
NSS vs. Multilingual Support 
(Eng-Chinese) 
 
Task: adapted from Jones’ 
study (1988) 
 
NSS: Set Range, Assign 
Utilities, Analyze 





Findings suggested significant effects of NSS 
support on individual outcome and joint outcome. 
Multilingual support helped to improve equality of 
outcome (under qualified conditions) but the time taken 




Single factor: NSS 
Task: four issues (price, 






Negotiators whose own strategies are less cooperative tend 
to submit more offers but fewer messages. People consider 
that they have less control over the negotiation process 
compared with those who adopt a more cooperative 
strategy, who make fewer offers but send more messages. 
Those in the cooperative cluster consistently feel friendlier 
about the negotiation and more satisfied with the outcome 
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and their performance.  
The proportion of negotiations reaching agreement is larger 




Face-to-face vs. NSS 
 
Task: a supervisor and a 
subordinate negotiating a 
performance budget for the 
subordinate. 
Web-based system 
containing multiple frames: 
a display of bids and 
counteroffers, a text box, a 
payoff calculator, a chat 




When supervisor performance expectations were 
incongruent with subordinate capability, face-to-face 
negotiations hit impasse at a significantly higher rate than 
NSS negotiations.  
 
NSS subordinates perceived more task conflict, which 
positively influenced post-negotiation performance, 
whereas face-to-face subordinates perceived less relational 
conflict, which worked through satisfaction to positively 
influence post-negotiation performance.  
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Negotiation Outcome 
Joint outcome or joint utility measures the efficiency of the negotiation (Goh et al., 
2000; Rangaswamy & Shell, 1997). It is measured by the sum of total multi-attribute 
utility scores of negotiators from both sides for the final agreement. It hence 
provides a measure of the total utility of a negotiated settlement. It serves a similar 
purpose as the efficient frontier. 
 
Contract balance measures the fairness of negotiation outcome (Goh et al., 2000; 
Rangaswamy & Shell, 1997). It is computed by the absolute value of the differences 
between the total utility scores achieved by each negotiator. The agreement is 
balanced, if the score equals to zero. It serves the similar purpose as the Nash 
solution. 
 
The distance to the efficient frontier measures the efficiency of the final agreement 
(Lim & Benbasat, 1993). All efficient solutions on the efficient frontier must be 






1 EFEFD −−−= = , Where Fb, Fs and Fb1, Fs1denotes buyer’s 
and seller’s utility scores for the final agreement and for efficient solution i 
respectively. Here l is the sequential index of efficient solutions, and n is the total 
number of efficient solutions. 
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Distance to the Nash bargaining solution measures the fairness of final agreement 
(Lim & Benbasat, 1993). The Nash bargaining solution refers to the maximum of 
the product of two parties’ utility gains. In informal terms, it is a solution from 
which no party has the incentive to deviate (Nash 1950, 1953). The Nash solution is 
identified before the distance can be calculated. The distance 
is 222 )()( sbb NFsNFD −+−= , where Fb, Fs and Nb, Ns refer to buyer’s and 
seller’s utility scores for the final agreement and for the Nash bargaining solution 
respectively. 
 
Satisfaction is an important measure of negotiation outcome (King & Hinson, 1994). 
It is essential that negotiators achieve satisfactory profits and are satisfied enough 
with the process to warrant further business. If negotiators achieve a higher joint 
outcome and better contract balance, they are likely to be more satisfied. In addition 
to performance, improved relationship with opponents and enjoyable interacting 
process would also increase the negotiators’ satisfaction. Normally, satisfaction is 
measured by post-negotiation questionnaire in lab experiments.  
 
Time to Settlement The use of NSS introduces an additional layer in negotiation 
process, which introduces additional complexity into the negotiation process. It 
would cost additional time comparing to negotiation with no computer support in 
using the DSS for keying the input, alternative generation and evaluation, and typing 
to communicate through electronic communication channels. Foroughi et al (1995) 
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and Delaney et al (1997) also provide empirical evidences that the DSS dyads take 
longer negotiation time than the dyads with no computer support. However, on the 
other hand, the use of the DSS helps to enhance the capability of processing 
information and analyzing complex problems, so that alternative generation and 
evaluation can be conducted much faster than computing them by human negotiators 
(Perkins et al., 1996).  
 
2.3 Gender and Negotiation 
2.3.1 Background Overview 
Research on gender in negotiation started from 1970s. Researchers mainly focused on 
the psychological aspect of individual differences. They tried to investigate whether 
gender of a negotiator would be a stable and reliable predictor of bargaining behavior 
and performance. However, the findings are disparate, inconclusive, and sometimes 
even contradictory (e.g., Rubin & Brown, 1975; Thompson, 1990). Some studies 
observed significant differences between male and female negotiators (e.g., Neu, et al., 
1988; King & Hinson, 1994); whereas some studies suggested that there was no 
significant difference in negotiation outcomes between male and female (e.g., 
Mintu-Wimsatt & Gassenheimer, 2000).  
 
Though the findings are controversial, many researchers still emphasized the 
importance of gender in understanding individual behaviors in negotiation (e.g., 
Thompson, 1990; Lewicki et al., 1994). With the development of contemporary 
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research in gender and social behavior, researchers argue that gender effects in 
negotiation would arise, be absent, or even be reversed under certain circumstances 
(Pruitt et al., 1986; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999; Kray et al., 2001; 2002). The 
relative power among the negotiators (Sussman & Tyson, 2000), modes of 
communication (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999), integrative potential of the 
negotiation task (Calhoun & Smith, 1999), and activation of sex stereotypes (Kray et 
al., 2001; 2002) may moderate the negotiator performance. In general, women are 
more cooperative, while men are more competitive in conflicts (Gayle et al., 1994; 
Krone et al., 1994; Walters et al., 1998). The literature also suggests that these gender 
differences disappear once being familiar among the negotiators. Several authors have 
provided rationales of this observation from different perspectives. 
 
1). Task and relationship orientation (Tannen, 1990; Hahn & Litwin, 1995). This 
theoretical explanation of gender differences starts with a premise on the nature of 
women and men. Men are task-oriented, independent, and value self-sufficiency. 
They view relationships in terms of status and dominance (Hofstede, 1991), and 
prefer conflict as its outcome largely determines one’s status in the world. Therefore, 
men behave more competitively than women. In contrast, women are relationship 
oriented, affable, and nurturing. Gilligan (1982) argued that women tend to be more 
sensitive to others’ needs and try to take others’ viewpoints into account. Facing a 
conflict, women are likely to be accommodating with the purpose of ending the 
conflict quickly and preserving the relationship.  
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2). Gender-role socialization and stereotypes (Deaux & LaFrance, 1998; Kray et al., 
2002). Some researches suggest that men and women learn to behave through 
gender-role socialization. According to the socialization perspective, both women 
and men are attached to their roles that are socially maintained across their life-span. 
Thus, individuals have to behave allied with gendered expectations (Sussman & 
Tyson, 2000). It has been demonstrated (Watson, 1994; Camras, 1994) that 
individuals are viewed negatively, if they behave differently from conventional 
gender-role stereotypes. Therefore, according to this perspective, men being 
competitive and women being cooperative is considered appropriate for their gender. 
This gender-role socialization would thus reinforce such stereotypes. 
 
2.3.2 Negotiation Strategies  
Dual Concern Model (see Table 1) postulates the two dimensions of concern: 
other-concern (cooperativeness) and self-concern (assertiveness), which can be used 
to describe one’s negotiation strategy. These two dimensions are consistent with 
Eagly’s (1987) review of gender differences on two types of qualities: communal 
and agentic. The communal dimension suggests being concern over the welfare of 
others, while the agentic dimension relates to being assertive, controlling, and 
goal-directed. As reviewed above, the Dual Concern Model provides insights to the 
question of how to achieve a more effective negotiation outcome. Theoretically, 
problem solving would be the best choice in most cases. 
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In general, women are likely to adopt a yielding strategy in negotiation (Calhoun & 
Smith, 1999), which is characterized as highly cooperative and relatively low 
assertiveness according to the Dual Concern Model. Besides, women are more likely 
than men to perceive the other party as cooperative and perceive them as friendly 
and trustworthy. They consistently make larger concessions, thus obtain lower joint 
outcomes than men in integrative bargaining (Main, 1991). This may due to a 
relatively high level of concern for their opponent, which leads to premature closure 
of a negotiation. In order to achieve a higher joint outcome, women need external 
assistance to reinforce the concern of their own profits to increase the resistance to 
yielding (Calhoun & Smith, 1999). Possible ways that are suggested are requiring 
the negotiator to achieve an explicit profit level (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984a; Pruitt et 
al., 1983), giving them a negative frame (Carnevale & Keenan, 1990), and making 
them accountable to constituents (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984b). 
 
On the other hand, men may tend to be tougher, more competitive, and have less 
concern for others (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984a; Walters et al., 1998). In general, they 
have a relatively high degree of assertiveness and a low degree of cooperativeness. 
Thus, according to the Dual Concern Model, they are likely to use the contending 
strategy, which leads to moderate joint outcome. To reach the agreement with higher 
joint outcome, men may need external incentives to increase the degree of 
cooperativeness, while maintaining high aspirations and concomitant resistance to 
yield. High concern for others’ outcome may be stimulated by introducing a positive 
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mood (Pruitt et al., 1983), or by fostering interpersonal bonds (e.g., friendship, love, 
perceived similarity), or by creating the expectation of cooperative future interaction 
(Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984a, b). 
 
A meta-analytic study (De Dreu et al., 2000) provided supportive evidence that 
negotiators are not fully rational for both women and men. They may fail to use 
problem solving strategy due to their cognitive bias and limitation, so as to be unable 
to reach integrative agreements. The notified cognitive deficits are fixed-pie 
perceptions, overconfidence, memory deficits, erroneous reasoning, and limited 
information processing abilities. Most of them may be reduced by the advancement of 
technology, particularly the negotiation support systems, as discussed in section 2.2 
above. 
 
2.3.4 Dyadic Gender Composition 
For every negotiation, there are two or more participants in a context with certain 
types of interdependence (Weigand et al., 2003). Negotiators from each side thus 
form a group. Group characteristics may influence the negotiation process and 
outcome, such as gender composition, cultural orientation of the group, group size, 
and number of parties in the group (Herschel, 1994; Savicki et al., 1996).  
 
In this study, we focus on the gender composition that may affect member behavior 
and perception (Karakowsky et al., 2004). The simplest form of a negotiation group 
is a dyad. There are three possible dyadic gender compositions: male-only dyad, 
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female-only dyad, and male-female dyad. They can be grouped into two types: 
homogeneous dyad and heterogeneous gender dyad.  
 
Developmental research suggests that masculinity and femininity of an individual 
may vary according to same-gender and other-gender contexts. In line with 
gender-role socialization and stereotypes perspective, individual expectations and 
perceptions regarding gender may possibly guide his/her response toward the 
opponent’s behavior (Deaux & Major, 1987). For instance, a man might react 
competitively with another man, but collaboratively with a woman. Consistently, 
both men and women use different communication modes when they encounter a 
same-gender and other-gender context (Deaux & LaFrance, 1998). They tend to 
adjust their behaviors in order to accommodate their conversational partners. 
Empirical work provides supportive evidence to the notion that men and women 
change gender-typed aspects of their behavior accordingly to the gender of others in 
the social context (e.g., Maccoby, 1998; Martin & Fabes, 2001; Pickard & Strough, 
2003). Hence, both men and women would perform differently at the bargaining 
table, according to the presence and behavior of their opponents. 
 
Homogeneous Gender Dyads 
Study of group gender composition (e.g., Dindia & Allen, 1992; Savicki et al., 1996) 
presumes that homogenous gender groups (i.e., male-only and female-only groups) 
represent extreme positions on several gender variables.  
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In female-only groups, women use more individually oriented language, and more 
self-disclosure, self-referent messages (Savicki et al., 1996). According to the Dual 
Concern Model, as both parties are relatively unassertive, they are considered to be 
accommodating. They are characterized as self-sacrificial deference to the other 
party’s needs, which implies a partial concession (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986a). This may 
lead to premature closure of the negotiation that is a tendency to prematurely 
finalize positions before considering all possible solution alternatives or reaching the 
optimal agreement (Kelley, 1966; Foroughui et al., 1995). They could achieve 
higher satisfaction toward the negotiation process (Savicki et al., 1996; King & 
Hinson, 1994).  
 
In male-only groups, men use less personal expression and more coarse language 
toward the task in computer-mediated communication (Savicki et al., 1996). They 
use significantly fewer individually oriented pronouns, change their opinions least as 
a result of group activity, and are the least satisfied with the group process. Both 
parties tend to focus on one’s own interests with limited consideration of the 
opponent’s welfare. Thus, contending is the common strategy for this type of dyad.  
 
Heterogeneous Gender Dyads 
Kanter (1977a, b) argued that the individual outcome in the heterogeneous gender 
dyad will depend more on other structural (e.g., bargaining orientation of the task) 
and personal factors (e.g., roles, abilities). In gender heterogeneous context, men 
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demonstrated more feminine behaviors than in the same-gender context (Smith et al., 
1999; Pickard & Strough, 2003). According to gender-role socialization and 
stereotypes perspective, when men and women work together on a task, they are 
likely to bring their own attitudes and expectations about the other gender into the 
context.  
 
According to self-verification theory, women are likely to view male stereotyped 
task as complex and challenging, thus they tend to perceive themselves in a less 
favorable situation (Karakowsky et al., 2004). Men have dominated negotiation for a 
long time, such that it is commonly considered a men-typed task. Therefore, women 
would generate low self-evaluations and expectancies, if the opponent is a man in a 
negotiation. In contrast, men with a chivalrous tendency would be more gentle and 
cooperative working with women (Cantrell & Butler, 1997). In group discussions, 
the number of supportive interruptions decreased when the number of women in the 
group increased (Smith-Lovin & Brody, 1989). However, men may still dominate 
the communication (Herschel, 1994). An experimental study of King and Hinson 
(1994) showed that men pairing with female opponent achieved better agreement in 
both buyer and seller roles. 
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CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
 
3.1 Research Model  
This research is motivated to investigate the interplay of NSS and gender 
composition on negotiation outcomes, through exploration and analysis of strategy 
dimensions used in negotiation process. The NSS literature suggests that NSS could 
help negotiators in various aspects, such as identifying key issues, evaluating 
proposals and generating alternatives (Foroughi et al., 1995; Delaney et al., 1997; 
Rangaswamy & Starke, 2000). Generally, many empirical studies showed that better 
agreements can be reached with NSS support. At the same time, negotiators’ 
perceptions and behaviors in negotiation vary according to their gender (Thompson, 
1990). Women are relation-oriented, whereas men are task-oriented (Gilligan, 1982; 
Tannen, 1990). In general, women are more cooperative, while men are more 
competitive in conflicts. Recent meta-analysis studies, which reviewed the gender 
effects in negotiation and choice of conflict management strategies, provided 
supportive evidence to this observation (Gayle et al., 1994; Krone et al., 1994; 
Walters et al., 1998).  
 
We propose a research model (see Figure 3) to delineate the interaction effect of 
gender compositions and the availability of NSS on negotiation strategy dimensions, 
in turn that affects the final negotiation outcomes. The independent variables in our 
model are gender composition, particularly female dyads and male dyads; and 
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availability of NSS support, particularly non-NSS (i.e., face-to-face) and NSS. The 
dependent variables consist of joint outcome, contract balance, and satisfaction 
towards outcome. The mediating variables are the two dimensions of negotiation 
strategy: degree of cooperativeness and degree of assertiveness (Thomas & Kilmann, 
1974; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). Degree of cooperativeness refers to the extent to which 
the individual attempts to satisfy the other person’s concerns. Degree of 
assertiveness refers to the extent to which the individual attempts to satisfy his or her 
own concerns.  
 
Figure 3: Proposed Research Model 
 
This study focuses on dyadic negotiation, thus gender composition in the proposed 
model implies either homogeneous- or heterogeneous-gender dyads. It has been 
suggested that pairing of negotiators with the same gender would allow more salient 
personality effect and behavior to emerge (Hermann & Kogan, 1977). In many 
research areas, such as psychology, computer mediated communication, negotiation, 
it is presumed that groups composed of all men or all women would represent 
Gender 
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extreme positions in several gender-related variables, whereas mixed groups would 
fall between the extremes (Dindia & Allen, 1992; Savicki et al., 1996). If there is a 
difference between men and women, then this difference is presumably held 
constant across the bargaining process in single-gender environments. Thus, it is 
more likely to capture the subtle gender effects in homogeneous gender group. To 
simplify the situation, this study only investigated the homogeneous gender dyads. 
 
3.2 Research Hypotheses 
3.2.1 Interaction Effect of Gender and Availability of NSS 
Lim and Benbasat (1993) proposed the following theory concerning NSS consisting 
of two components: decision support system (DSS) and electronic communication 
channel (EC). The use of DSS would help negotiators to refine their objectives, 
generate alternatives, and evaluate solutions by enhancing the capability of 
information processing and analyzing complex problems. The use of EC would 
increase the level of perceived commitment and trust in the other party by facilitating 
better communication. Thus, agreements may be reached in a faster manner with 
greater satisfaction. 
 
Degree of Cooperativeness 
As one dimension of strategy, degree of cooperativeness refers to the extent to 
which the individual attempts to satisfy the other person’s concerns (Thomas & 
Kilmann, 1974; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986a). It is closely related to the concept of 
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other-concern in the Dual Concern Model (Pruitt, 1983; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986a). 
 
In face-to-face negotiation, negotiators can better engage and build friendly 
atmosphere through the process of uncovering underlying interests and trust building 
(Valley et al., 1998; Purdy et al., 2000). Literature suggests that women are 
cooperative, and make more concessions in a negotiation (Gayle et al., 1994; Krone et 
al., 1994; Walters et al., 1998). They have a relatively high concern of their 
opponents (Gilligan, 1982), and are more sensitive to contextual and nonverbal cues 
(Gefen & Straub, 1997). Hence, female dyads have a relatively high degree of 
cooperativeness in face-to-face negotiation. 
 
In NSS facilitated negotiation, negotiators communicate through EC, where they 
perceive lower social presence than they would perceive in face-to-face negotiation 
(Poole & Jackson, 1993; Rice, 1993). Social presence1, which women value, refers to 
one’s feeling of the involvement of the other persons in a communication exchange 
(Short et al., 1976). This reduced social presence typically affects the effectiveness in 
information exchange (Walther et al., 1994), as oral cues and visual cues are limited. 
It is more difficult to build trust and relationship in the media with low social 
presence. Thus, the degree of cooperativeness of female dyads will be reduced due to 
the decreased social presence of their opponents in this poorer communication media 
                                                 
1 It is noted that social presence theory has been criticized by its neglect of the time factor. However, 
time effect to reduce this cues-filtered-out suggested by social information processing theory 
(Walther, 1992) may not apply here, as there is a time limitation in most negotiations.  
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(Purdy et al., 2000). In the meantime, negotiating with the DSS component, 
negotiators have to estimate the opponents’ interests and concerns, so that the 
software can generate near optimal solutions for both parties. This step could further 
enhance female negotiators’ concerns of their opponents. Hence, taking together the 
effects of EC and DSS, the degree of cooperativeness of female dyads in NSS 
supported negotiation is comparable with it in face-to-face negotiation.  
 
In contrast, men behave competitively in face-to-face negotiation (Eagly, 1995). They 
have a relatively low other-concern, but focusing on one’s own interests (Ben-Yoav & 
Pruitt, 1984a; Walters et al., 1998). Hence, in face-to-face negotiation, men have a 
relatively low degree of cooperativeness. 
 
Men are less sensitive to contextual and nonverbal cues (Gefen & Straub, 1997). 
Therefore, EC component is unlikely to change their degree of cooperativeness in 
NSS facilitated negotiation. Similar to female negotiators, DSS component would 
increase their concern of their opponents through the steps of estimating opponents’ 
interests. In this situation, they are more cooperative than in face-to-face negotiation. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that,  
 
Hypothesis 1: The increase of degree of cooperativeness due to availability of 
NSS is stronger for male dyads than for female dyads. 
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Degree of Assertiveness 
Degree of assertiveness refers to the extent to which the individual attempts to satisfy 
his or her own concerns (Thomas & Kilmann, 1974; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). Women 
generally have less self-concern (Calhoun & Smith, 1999). They tend to perceive the 
other party as friendly, and make more self-sacrifice to accommodate their opponents 
(Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). Hence, the degree of assertiveness of female dyads is 
relatively low in face-to-face negotiation. 
 
In NSS facilitated negotiation, at the preparation stage, DSS assist negotiators to 
identify the keys issues and calculate the “bargaining table”. The display of 
bargaining table and proposed solutions consistently remind negotiators about their 
objectives. As a consequence, DSS can provide external assistance to reinforce their 
self-concern, thereby increasing the resistance to yielding. EC component per se is 
unlikely to stimulate women’s self-concern or resistance to yielding. However, EC 
would reinforce the effect of DSS, as negotiators have to interact with the computer 
all the time, which displays the key issues and bargaining table in front of them. 
Research in CMC also suggests that people would be absorbed in their tasks and the 
self via communicating through electronic media (Walther & Park, 2002).  
 
According to the literature, men have high self-concern in negotiation. They tend to 
behave more aggressively, as they consider their status largely determined by the 
outcome of conflicts (Tannen, 1990). The desire to outperform their opponents and 
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the perception of opponents’ offensiveness may increase their resistance to yielding. 
When negotiating face-to-face, the perception of competitive atmosphere in male 
dyads is more salient, such that their reaction would be more aggressive 
(Bettencourt & Miller, 1996). Thus, male dyads have a relatively high degree of 
assertiveness in face-to-face negotiation. 
 
In NSS facilitated negotiation, for male dyads, display of key issues and bargaining 
table will increase their self-concern. The increased self-concern will lead to higher 
degree of assertiveness of male dyads. Carnevale and Isen (1986) suggested putting 
a barrier between the two negotiators to reduce perceived pressure from the 
opponent. This barrier could be geographical distance, an intervener, or a computer. 
Negotiating with NSS support can provide such a barrier, the EC component. It has 
been shown that men use less personal expression in CMC context (Savicki et al., 
1996), such that fewer irrational conflict escalations might occur. Similar to female 
dyads, EC reinforces the effect of DSS, while it largely hinders conflict escalation 
and keeps the negotiator focusing on the task. Thus, in NSS facilitated negotiation, 
the degree of assertiveness of male dyads is comparable with it in face-to-face 
negotiations. Therefore, we hypothesize that,  
 
Hypothesis 2: The increase of degree of assertiveness due to availability of NSS 
is stronger for female dyads than for male dyads. 
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3.2.3 Strategy Dimensions and Negotiation Outcome  
In this study, we investigate three negotiation outcomes: joint outcome, contract 
balance, and satisfaction towards the outcome. Joint outcome provides a measure of 
the total utility of the negotiated settlement. Contract balance measures the fairness 
of the negotiation outcome. It is computed as the absolute value of the differences 
between the total utility scores achieved by each negotiator. Satisfaction towards the 
outcome essentially refers to negotiators’ satisfactory level towards the contracts as 
a result of agreement reached through negotiation. 
 
Degree of Cooperativeness 
Negotiators with high degree of cooperativeness have strong other-concern. The 
Dual Concern Model proposed by Pruitt and colleagues (Pruitt, 1983; Pruitt & 
Rubin, 1986a, b) depicts the relationship between negotiation strategies and joint 
outcome. According to this model, while the level of self-concern holds consistent, 
greater level of other-concern will lead to higher joint outcomes. Normally, 
negotiators with high degree of cooperativeness have a positive mood towards the 
situation (Carnevale & Isen, 1986), or a positive expectation of future cooperation 
with their opponents (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984a, b). While both parties have high 
concern of their opponents’ interests, they try to satisfy the opponents’ requirements 
concurrently, and tend to reach fairer agreements (Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992). 
The difference between individual outcomes in the final agreement will be reduced 
by the effort to address the other party’s concerns. Thus, the higher the degree of 
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cooperativeness, the smaller contract balance can be achieved. Here, the value of 
contract balance represents the difference of scores achieved by two parties in the 
final settlement. Cooperation is important in developing mutual satisfaction (Pruitt 
& Rubin, 1986a, b). When the groups have high degree of cooperativeness, they 
tend to achieve a relatively good joint outcome and contract balance. This leads to 
greater satisfaction towards the outcome (Foroughi et al, 1995; Delaney, 1997). In 
short, joint outcome, contract balance, and satisfaction towards the outcome will be 
improved with higher degree of cooperativeness. Therefore, we hypothesize that, 
 
Hypothesis 3a: The degree of cooperativeness is positively related to joint outcome. 
Hypothesis 3b: The degree of cooperativeness is negatively related to contract 
balance. 
Hypothesis 3c: The degree of cooperativeness is positively related to negotiator 
satisfaction towards the outcome. 
 
Degree of Assertiveness 
Negotiators with high degree of assertiveness have strong self-concern. They behave 
tougher and resist yielding (De Dreu et al., 2000). Thus, they make fewer 
concessions in a negotiation, so that it is less likely that they will “leave money on 
the table” (Kelley, 1966). According to the Dual Concern Model, the degree of 
cooperativeness holds consistent, the higher level of assertiveness will lead to higher 
joint outcomes. There is no evident relationship in the extant literature on degree of 
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assertiveness and contract balance. Therefore, we do not hypothesize any 
relationship between these two variables. With higher joint outcome, the groups with 
high degree of assertiveness will have a greater satisfaction towards the outcome 
(Foroughi et al, 1995; Delaney, 1997). Therefore, we hypothesize that, 
 
Hypothesis 4a: The degree of assertiveness is positively related to joint outcome. 
Hypothesis 4b: The degree of assertiveness is positively related to negotiator 
satisfaction towards the outcome. 
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CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH METHOD 
 
To empirically test the hypotheses proposed in section 3.2, we conducted a 
laboratory experiment. It is commonly agreed that laboratory experiment provides 
the advantages in strengthening causal relationships and internal control (Neuman, 
2003). The experiment approach can enforce the temporal order between 
independent variables and dependent variables. The negotiation process and 
outcomes are subject to many potential variables, such as individual differences, 
negotiation task, culture, etc. With laboratory experiment, we could control certain 
variables to rule out these possible alternative explanations. Thus, the effects caused 
by variables of interest can be observed with higher reliability and validity. As this 
study aims to uncover the “black box” of negotiation process, careful observation of 
negotiator behavior and records of their communication in experiment would 
provide rich data to understand how the independent variables led to the final 
outcomes.  
 
In this chapter, experiment design, experiment task and manipulation, variables and 
measurement are described in detail. 
 
4.1 Experiment Design 
In this experiment, the unit of analysis is the negotiation dyad. The independent 
variables are (1) gender composition, specifically female dyad and male dyad; and 
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(2) availability of NSS support, specifically face-to-face (Non-NSS) and NSS. Thus, 
four conditions are defined in a 2x2 factorial design (see Figure 4). 
 
Availability of NSS Support 
 
  Gender Composition 
 Female Dyad 
      Male Dyad 
 
Figure 4: Experimental Design 
 
4.2 Subjects 
To conduct this experiment, we recruited 80 students from a well-known university 
in Asia. Therefore, 40 valid dyads were formed in total, such that each cell 
contained 10 dyads.  
 
4.3 Experiment Task 
This experiment task was adapted from Jones’ study (1988), which involved 
negotiation between a seller (Baines Distributor) and a buyer (James Enterprise, Inc.) 
over four issues---unit price, purchased quantity, time of first delivery, and warranty 
period--- for a purchase agreement for turbochargers (Appendix A). To better 
capture the subtle gender effect, only a low conflict task was adopted (Raiffa, 1982). 
In this low conflict task, buyers were concerned about purchased quantity and 






 - 63 -
A pilot test was conducted during the task construction period to ensure that the 
subjects understood the information as anticipated by the researcher.  
 
4.4 Experiment Manipulation 
4.4.1 Independent Variables 
Upon the arrival of subjects, dyads were formed according to their gender. Thus, 
two kinds of homogeneous gender composition would be formed. Availability of 
NSS support was manipulated by the different types of supporting tools. For the 
Non-NSS groups, subjects communicated without any computer support in a 
face-to-face setting. For the NSS groups, subjects were provided a web-based 
negotiation system (see Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5: NSS Interface 
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This negotiation system consists of an alternative evaluator (Foroughi et al., 1995; 
Goh et al., 2000), an alternative generator (Foroughi et al., 1995; Delaney et al., 
1997; Goh et al., 2000), and a text-messaging tool. By providing own issue ratings 
as private data, the alternative evaluator could calculate the utility point achieved for 
a particular contract. If the estimation on the opponent’s issue rating was entered 
into the system, the alternative generator would return the three best optimal 
agreements with the highest joint outcome and lowest contract balance. Via the 
text-messaging tool, information and offers could be exchanged between buyer and 
seller. In addition, contract-related buttons - “Propose”, “Reject” and “Accept”- 
were integrated with the text-messaging tool, to ease the effort of keying in the 
proposed contracts and their decisions on opponents’ offers. 
 
4.4.2 Control Variables 
In this study, other pertinent variables were kept consistent to ensure the internal 
validity. Random assignment of role, dyad and treatment group made sure no effects 
of age, culture, and negotiation experience. It was checked that the subjects did not 
have personal relationship prior to the study. This allowed us to eliminate some 
possible confounds so that the driving force behind could be identified easier. Every 
subject was given a file folder as the basic reward to produce sufficient motivation. 
The dyad with best performance for each session received a voucher with face value 
of S$50 as the bonus reward. This reward information was emphasized in the 
negotiation preparation stage. 
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4.5 Experimental Procedure 
Two trained experimenters in charge of two multi-media laboratories carried out all 
the sessions using standardized guidelines and instructions. The negotiation process 
can be characterized as a three-staged process: preparation, actual negotiation, and 
performance assessment (Thompson, 2001). 
 
In pre-negotiation phase, subjects were randomly assigned as buyers and sellers.  
• Instruction: Subjects were given a packet of confidential task materials 
describing the general nature of the negotiation and what role they would play in 
the exercise. Both buyers and sellers received a set of guidelines on the four 
issues and the acceptable range of each issue for their companies.  
• Allocation: For face-to-face dyads, the corresponding buyer and seller were 
located in the same room. They were seated at opposite end of a small square 
table. For NSS dyads, buyers and sellers were separately seated in two adjacent 
multi-media laboratories.  
• Training: NSS dyads were given a short training on how to use the software. 
• Pre-negotiation questionnaire: Each subject completed a questionnaire of 
personal information and a few questions to ensure there was no significant 
difference between the subjects’ background and their understanding of the task 
(Appendix B).   
• Experiment Time: Both instructors recorded down the starting time immediately 
in respective Experiment Log Sheets. 
 - 66 -
In negotiation phase, experimenters kept silent and conscious of potential collision 
between negotiating parties. 
 
In Post-Negotiation phase, some assessments were recorded.  
• Post-negotiation questionnaire: Upon settlement, subjects filled up an agreement 
form and a Post-negotiation questionnaire (Appendix C).  
• Post-negotiation record: Both instructors recorded down the ending time 
immediately in respective Experiment Log Sheets. For face-to-face groups, 
conversations were recorded. For NSS groups, chat log files were saved. 
• Reward: At the end of each session, subjects were given the basic reward to 
appreciate their time and effort. 
• Leaving: Upon leaving, subjects were told explicitly not to reveal the experimental 
details to others. 
 
4.6 Measurement of Dependent Variables 
4.6.1 Dimensions of Negotiation Strategy 
A log file of each dyad was documented for the analysis of the degree of 
cooperativeness and the degree of assertiveness. For face-to-face dyads, tape was 
used to record their conversations. For NSS dyads, the communication activities 
through electronic communication channel between the two parties were saved by 
computer. To capture the strategies used by negotiators, frequency analysis of 
negotiation process was used (Weingart et al., 2004).   
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Coding Scheme Development 
We adopted the coding scheme on negotiation strategy in Ben-Yoav and Pruitt’s 
(1984b) study. The coding scheme was further adjusted by incorporating the 
indicators in Calhoun and Smith’s (1999) study. Two coders independently coded 
20% of the transcripts. Based on ease of use and agreement on the definitions, the 
coding scheme was refined by narrowing some categories that were too broad and 
combining some categories that were similar. Table 5 is the finalized coding scheme 
for this study. 
 









o Truthful information was given about the 
negotiator's priorities  
o Truthful information was given about the 
negotiator's preferences 
o Ask questions about preferences 
o Ask questions about priorities 
Heuristic 
Trial 
o The negotiator explores various offer at about one 
value before proceeding to a lower level 
o Make multi-issue offer 




o Show insights 
o Note general differences 
o Note general similarity 
o Makes positive comments 
o Suggest compromise 
o Other process suggestions 
Assertiveness Threat o The negotiator uses of threat languages, such as “I 
won’t cooperative with in future”, “I’d like to order 
from others” 
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Positional 
Commitment 
o When it contained a strong statement that the 
speaker was unwilling to change his or her 
proposal. An example is “I really cannot agree with 
anything but a monetary fine.” 
o Refer to bottom line 
o Refer to power  




o Arguments that the opponent should concede for 
reasons that relate to the commercial setting 
hypothetically surrounding the negotiation. 
Push to 
closure 
o Time check 
 
 
4.6.2 Negotiation Outcome 
A point sheet adopted from Jones (1988) and Delaney et al. (1997) was used to assign 
weights to all negotiation issues. The more important a negotiation issue was, the 
higher the utility score was assigned. The utilities of the individual values were used 
to calculate a total, multi-attribute utility score for individual outcome. For example, 
A derived the following utility points: Uxa for X, Uya for Y, Uza for Z, and Una for 
N. Thus,  
Individual outcomes of A = (Uxa + Uya + Uza + Una)  
 
Contract balance was computed by the absolute value of the difference between the 
total utility scores achieved by each negotiator. It ranged from zero for a balanced 
contract to a higher number for an unbalanced one.  
Contract balance = |[(Uxa + Uya + Uza + Una) - (Uxb + Uyb + Uzb + Unb)]| 
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Satisfaction towards Outcome was measured in the post-negotiation questionnaire 
at the end of the experiment. To measure this construct, we carefully adapted four 
items from Spreng et al.’s (1996) study. 
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CHAPTER 5 DATA ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 Overview  
This chapter reports the results of all statistical analysis performed on the 
experimental data with SPSS statistical software package version 14. Five percent 
level of significance was adopted for all statistical tests. Firstly, validation tests were 
performed to ensure the experiment manipulation, control, and instrument reliability 
and validity. Next, statistical analysis was undertaken to test the research hypotheses. 
Both main effects and interaction effect revealed from the results were highlighted.  
 
5.2 Validation Tests 
5.2.1 Manipulation Test 
The availability of NSS was manipulated by providing computer support or without 
any support. A few questions were asked in a pre-negotiation questionnaire 
(Appendix B) to check if subjects understood their roles and the system to be used. 
The responses indicated a successful manipulation. 
 
5.2.2 Control Check 
In the pre-negotiation questionnaire, the subjects were asked to indicate their 
negotiation experience. The responses showed that all of them had very little 
negotiation experience. Moreover, subjects were asked if they knew each other 
before this experiment. The responses indicated that they had no personal 
relationship. Age and culture were controlled through random assignment. All of the 
 - 71 -
subjects came from Asian countries. The results of MANOVA test indicated that 
was no difference among all cells in terms of age (see Table 6).  
 
Table 6: Pre-experimental Group Differences 
Dependent Variable: Age  
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 2.819(a) 3 .940 .486 .694
Intercept 19735.806 1 19735.806 10204.510 .000
Gender 2.756 1 2.756 1.425 .240
System .006 1 .006 .003 .955
Gender * System .056 1 .056 .029 .866
Error 69.625 36 1.934   
Total 19808.250 40    
Corrected Total 72.444 39    
 
5.2.3 Scale Validation 
Three tests are used to determine the convergent validity of satisfaction towards 
outcome: (1) the reliability of questions, (2) the composite reliability of constructs, 
and (3) the average variance extracted by constructs. The results (see Table 7) showed 
that all questions had reliability score greater than 0.8 with 0.767 cumulative 
Eigenvalue; the composite reliability of this construct with multiple indicators was 
above 0.7 criterion (Nunnally, 1978); the average variance extracted of this construct 
was higher than 0.7; Cronbach’s alpha was higher than 0.8. These results indicated 
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Table 7: Psychometric Properties of the Measurement on Satisfaction 








Satisfaction towards Outcome  
1. I am pleased with the final agreement 
in this negotiation. 
0.833 
2. I am delighted with my own 
performance as a negotiator. 
0.875 
3. I am happy with the number of utility 
points. 
0.909 
4. I think the outcome of this 
negotiation is satisfactory for my 
company. 
0.884 
0.929 0.894 0.767 
 
5.3 Coding of the Process Variables 
Following Weber’s (1990) guideline of content analysis, the basic unit of analysis in 
this study was sentence within messages. Some widely accepted symbols were 
coded as single actions. Examples of these symbols are as follows: “☺”, “^o^”. Two 
coders independently identified the number of units of 20% of the total transcripts 
collected for this study. The unitizing reliability (Folger et al., 1984) was 0.83.  
 
In this study, frequency analysis was used, as it was considered as one of the most 
appropriate methods when the research trying to answer the causal relationship 
among strategies and outcomes (Weingart et al., 2004). Two coders independently 
coded 20% of the total transcripts that complies a 0.79 inter-rater reliability of the 
coding result. One major rater coded the remaining transcripts. Both reliability of 
unitizing and content coding were above the suggested acceptable values by 
Lombard et al. (2002). 
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The descriptive statistics of degree of cooperativeness and degree of assertiveness 
are presented in Table 8. For each dyad, the degree of cooperativeness equals to the 
number of cooperative units divided by the total number of the coding units in their 
scripts, whereas the degree of assertiveness equals to the number of assertive units 
divided by the total number of the coding units in their scripts. 
 
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics of Cooperativeness and Assertiveness 




Female Dyads        with 0.437 (0.089) 0.166 (0.050) 10 
without 0.305 (0.069) 0.149 (0.056) 10 
Male Dyads          with 0.381 (0.052) 0.164 (0.039) 10 
without 0.255 (0.056) 0.215 (0.059) 10 
 
5.4 Hypotheses Tests 
5.4.1 The Interaction Effects  
5.4.1.1 Interaction Effects Testing 
Two-way ANOVA tests on each of the two process variables were conducted to 
investigate whether there was any interaction effect of gender composition and 
availability of NSS. Figure 6 and 7 plotted interaction effects graphically on the 
process variables with gender composition as horizontal axis and availability of NSS 
as separated lines. Shown in figure 7, the interaction effect of gender composition by 
availability of NSS on degree of assertiveness was detected. 
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Figure 7: Interaction Effect of Degree of Assertiveness 
 
Table 9 provided the summary of ANOVA tests. Here, p<0.05 was denoted with * 
while for p<0.01 was denoted with **. 
 
Table 9: The summary of the Two-way ANOVA results 








F = 0.057, 
P <0.812 
F = 35.251, 
P <0.001** 
F = 5.455, 




F = 4.405, 
P <0.043* 
F = 3.008, 
P < 0.091 
F = 4.188, 
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5.4.1.2 Further Exploration on the Interaction Effect 
One-way ANOVA tests were used to further investigate the interaction effect for 
degree of assertiveness by holding one independent variable constant at any one 
time. The significance levels for each test case were showed respectively in table 10, 
and summarized in table 11. 
 
Table 10: One-Way ANOVA Test of Degree of Assertiveness 
Constant: System = 1 (NSS)  
 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .000 1 .000 .011 .919
Within Groups .036 18 .002   
Total .036 19    
 
Constant: System = -1 (Face-to-Face) 
 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .021 1 .021 6.418 .021
Within Groups .060 18 .003   
Total .081 19    
 
Constant: Gender = 1 (Male dyads) 
 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .013 1 .013 5.049 .037
Within Groups .045 18 .003   
Total .058 19    
 
Constant: Gender = -1 (Female dyads)    
 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups .001 1 .001 .513 .483
Within Groups .051 18 .003   
Total .052 19    
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Gender Composition Availability of NSS 
Face-to-Face NSS Male Female 
Degree of Assertiveness F = 6.418,  
P < 0.021* 
F = 0.011,  
P < 0.919 
F = 5.049,  
P < 0.037* 
F = 0.513 
P < 0.483 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01;  
 
5.4.2 The Effects of Process Variables on Outcome Variables 
Multiple regressions were used to test the effects of process variables on outcome 
variables. As summarized in Table 12, degree of cooperativeness (t = 3.870, p < 0.01) 
and degree of assertiveness (t = 2.280, p < 0.05) were significant predictors of joint 
outcome (R = 0.281). Degree of cooperativeness (t = -3.572, p < 0.01) was a 
significant predictor of contract balance (R = 0.278). Although both degree of 
cooperativeness and degree of assertiveness were strong predictors of negotiator 
satisfaction towards outcome, they were not significant at α = 0.05 level.  
 
Table 12: Summary of Process Variables’ Effect on Negotiation Outcome 
Hypothesis  Path Coefficient t-Value 
Degree of Cooperativeness 
→ Joint Outcomes (H3a) 0.538 3.870** 
   → Contract Balance (H3b) -0.497 -3.572** 
   → Satisfaction towards Outcome (H3c) 0.292   1.834 
Degree of Assertiveness 
→ Joint Outcomes (H4a) 0.317      2.280* 
   → Satisfaction towards Outcome (H4b) 0.205      1.284  
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; Two-tail test 
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Hypotheses test results were summarized in Table 13. 
 
Table 13: Summary of Hypotheses Tests 
Hypotheses Support
H1:  The increase of degree of cooperativeness due to availability of NSS is 
stronger for male dyads than for female dyads. No 
H2:  The increase of degree of assertiveness due to availability of NSS is 
stronger for female dyads than for male dyads. No 
H3a: The degree of cooperativeness is positively related to joint outcome. Yes 
H3b: The degree of cooperativeness is negatively related to contract balance. Yes 
H3c: The degree of cooperativeness is positively related to satisfaction towards 
the outcome. No 
H4a: The degree of assertiveness is positively related to joint outcome. Yes 
H4b: The degree of assertiveness is positively related to satisfaction towards the 
outcome. 
No 
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CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATION 
 
6.1 Discussion of Results 
6.1.1 Interaction Effect on Process Variables 
This study aims to explore the interaction effect of gender composition and 
availability of NSS on the two negotiation strategy dimensions. The findings of our 
experiment revealed that there was a significant joint effect on degree of assertiveness, 
but not on the degree of cooperativeness.  
 
Degree of Cooperativeness 
Instead of an interaction effect, both gender composition and availability of NSS 
demonstrated significant main effects on the degree of cooperativeness. The findings 
showed that female dyads were more cooperative than male dyads in both face-to-face 
and NSS negotiation settings. NSS led to higher degree of cooperativeness for both 
female dyads and male dyads than dyads with no computer support. 
 
Probable explanations may come from the internal design of the NSS system used in 
this study. Firstly, the DSS included an alternative generator (Foroughi et al., 1995; 
Delaney et al., 1997; Goh et al., 2000), which suggested optimal alternatives 
according to negotiators’ own issue ratings and their estimates of the opponents’ issue 
ratings. In order to make a proposal that was more likely to be accepted by the 
opponent, the negotiator needed to properly adjust her/his opponent’s issue rating 
based on the information obtained through communication. This step could largely 
 - 79 -
increase negotiators’ concern for their opponents. Moreover, according to the 
information input by the negotiator, the alternative generator produced three optimal 
agreements with the highest joint outcome and lowest contract balance each time. 
Based on these suggestions, which had incorporated the opponents’ interests, the 
proposals made would demonstrate greater concern of the opponents. In addition, as 
discussed before, EC might re-enforce the effect of DSS component in increasing the 
degree of cooperativeness.  
 
Secondly, the EC component, a text-messaging tool in this study, enabled 
synchronized online chatting and offer-exchange capabilities through integration with 
contract-proposing function. It greatly eased the effort of keying in the details of 
every single proposed contract from time to time. Our transcripts revealed that both 
female dyads and male dyads made more alternative proposals in NSS setting than 
they did in face-to-face negotiation. As a result, information could be exchanged in a 
greater extent, and led to better understanding of opponents’ concerns. Consequently, 
it might partially offset the effect of reduced social presence in NSS facilitated 
negotiation. Hence, we observed that NSS led to a higher degree of cooperativeness 
for female dyads. 
 
Degree of Assertiveness 
A significant interaction effect of gender composition and availability on the degree of 
assertiveness was found. To have a closer look on how these two variables affected 
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the degree of assertiveness, we conducted one-way ANOVA tests by holding one 
independent variable constantly at one time (refer to 5.4.1.2). In face-to-face 
negotiation, male dyads were more assertive than female dyads, which reconfirmed 
the general observation that men are more assertive than women in face-to-face 
negotiation (Gayle et al., 1994; Krone et al., 1994; Walters et al., 1998).  
 
However, this difference was not shown in NSS facilitated negotiation. Interestingly, 
male dyads were less assertive in NSS facilitated negotiation than they were in 
face-to-face negotiation. For female dyads, degree of assertiveness was higher in NSS 
facilitated negotiation than it was in face-to-face negotiation, but this difference failed 
to meet the significant level. 
 
Negotiation task characteristics and system design may provide some explanations of 
lower degree of assertiveness for male dyads in NSS negotiation. Firstly, men tend to 
have more face-saving behaviors, as they feel that their social statuses are largely 
determined by the outcome of conflicts (Tannen, 1990). In face-to-face negotiation, 
they avoid to make concessions. With NSS, the suggestions provided by alternative 
generators could help them to achieve more optimal outcomes, such that they might 
make certain compromises (Anson & Jelassi, 1990). Secondly, in our experiment, 
only low conflict task was used, where negotiators’ preferences for the four issues 
were not directly against each other. In the low conflict task, it was easier to make 
trade-off in order to achieve mutual beneficial agreement, especially when they were 
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assisted by DSS to consider a package instead of a single issue. Hence, they were 
more likely to make some concessions on less important issues, which led to the 
observation of a lower degree of assertiveness. Lastly, men have the tendency to 
escalate conflict, especially when their opponents are male. They are likely to be 
distracted by the hostile behavior of their counterparty. With NSS, this irrational 
escalation of conflict could be avoided. The DSS component helped negotiators to 
reduce the difficulty of the task, and thus alleviate the tendency toward negative 
climate. The absence of visual communication in CMC prevented negotiators from 
being distracted from the interested issues (Foroughi et al., 1995), thus helping them 
to reduce personality conflict (Lim & Benbasat, 1992) and focus on the task 
(Sheffield, 1992). Thus, male dyads behaved less assertively in NSS setting. 
 
For female dyads, the degree of assertiveness observed in face-to-face negotiation was 
comparable to the NSS negotiation. This may be due to the ineffective stimulation of 
resistance to yielding at the pre-negotiation stage. Although the system asked the 
negotiators to input their issues of interests with corresponding utility points and their 
bottom line at the negotiation preparation stage, this information was never asked or 
displayed during the negotiation process. Subjects were given documents to 
understand the task, including general instruction, background information of the 
represented company and counterparty, and confidential information of the 
negotiation case. It was difficult for them to absorb all important information due to 
the time constraint and information processing capacity (Miller, 1956). In this 
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circumstance, they were likely to put more attention on issues that they cared about 
(Gabriel & Gardner, 1999). Women, who are relation-oriented (Tanne, 1990), would 
put more focus more on the information related to their opponent (Josephs et al., 1992; 
Ross & Holmberg, 1992), so that they can establish good interpersonal harmony and 
relationship. Hence, less attention was given to self-interests, and led to the 
observation of no difference on the self-concern aspect between face-to-face 
negotiation and NSS facilitated negotiation. 
 
6.1.2 Effects of Strategy Dimensions on Negotiation Outcomes 
Joint Outcome 
In this study, we demonstrated that both the degree of cooperativeness and degree of 
assertiveness were significant predictors of joint outcome. This finding reconfirmed 
the assertions made in the Dual Concern Model (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986a; Pruitt, 2001). 
As illustrated in this model, with consistent degree of self-concern, higher degree of 
other-concern leads to higher joint outcomes. Likewise, higher degree of self-concern 
leads to higher joint outcomes by holding the other strategy dimension constant. The 
experimental results are consistent with prior empirical findings in the literature of 
negotiation strategy (Calhoun & Smith, 1999). 
 
Contract Balance 
The hypothesis that dyads with a higher degree of cooperativeness will achieve more 
balanced contracts is supported by the experiment results. It is consistent with the 
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findings in negotiation literature (Valley et al., 1998). Contract balance reflects the 
fairness of the final agreement. When negotiators have high concern of the opponents’ 
welfare, they are likely to achieve agreements with more fair distribution of outcomes 
(Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992). With the awareness of the approximate number of 
points earned by the opponent, negotiators tend to reach agreement that they feel fair 
for both parties (Jones, 1988; Foroughi et al., 1995).  
 
Satisfaction towards Outcome 
The experiment results indicated that neither degree of cooperativeness nor degree of 
assertiveness was significantly related to negotiator satisfaction towards outcome. 
Although better negotiation outcome can be achieved with greater degree of 
cooperativeness and degree of assertiveness, there might be other factors influencing 
the negotiation satisfaction towards outcome. Both negotiation outcome and its 
relative value to one’s expectation have strong associations with one’s satisfaction 
(Rushinek & Rushinek, 1986). Based on the Disconfirmation Theory (Churchill & 
Suprenant, 1982), the gap between the actual negotiation outcome and negotiator’s 
expectation determines his/her satisfaction. When the outcomes meet or exceed the 
initial expectation, one would be satisfied (Bhattacherjee, 2001). It has been 
empirically demonstrated that the gap between one’s expectation and final outcome 
was a more significant predictor to satisfaction than the outcome itself in NSS 
facilitated negotiation context (Wang & Lim, 2007). 
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6.2 Implications 
The findings of this study would enrich the knowledge of negotiation strategy and 
gender effects in negotiation. They could contribute toward system design, 
negotiation preparation, and negotiator training. The implications are multifold. 
 
Although a number of studies have demonstrated that degree of assertiveness and 
degree of cooperativeness are positively related to joint outcome, no empirical 
research has studied these relationships in computer supported negotiation. Prior 
research on negotiation strategies is mainly in the face-to-face context. Our research 
systematically extends the line of research to NSS field. 
 
This study shed light on the ‘black-box’ of negotiation process. Through the two 
strategy dimensions, we could better explain how NSS assist negotiators achieve 
better negotiation outcomes. Agreements with higher joint outcome could be reached 
with more cooperative and assertive strategies adopted. The results also indicated that 
the NSS system used in our study could help negotiators behave more cooperatively 
for both gender dyads. However, the system failed to maintain a relatively high degree 
of assertiveness for male dyads. Female dyads showed a comparable degree of this 
dimension in face-to-face and NSS setting. This observation suggested that system 
designers might incorporate certain functions/components to increase the negotiators’ 
self-concern. Possible solutions include a display of the negotiator’s own objective 
and bottom line on the system interface and explicitly highlighting the gain/loss of the 
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utility point above bottom line. In addition, the experiment design might be further 
improved by putting more emphasis on the accountability to the represented company 
(Benton & Druckman, 1973; Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984b).  
 
Gender differences on negotiation behavior had been observed in face-to-face 
negotiation. Consistent with the literature, without computer support, men were 
more assertive, while women were more cooperative in our study. These differences 
could be affected by the use of NSS. Our study showed that NSS influenced female 
and male dyads in different ways. This observation suggested that system designers 
might customize the system according to user’s gender, such that users could be 
better facilitated. For example, female friendly NSS could include a component 
display for an explicit profit level (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984a) and accountability to 
constituents (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984b), so that female negotiator could maintain 
high aspiration (Walton & McKerie, 1965) and self-concern (Pruitt et al., 1983). 
 
Practically, our findings suggest that a negotiation training course could be designed 
based on negotiators’ gender type. For female negotiator, more efforts may be 
needed to reinforce the concern of their own profits to increase the resistance to 
yielding. At the preparation stage, they need to set an explicit profit level. For male 
negotiators, to increase their concern of opponents’ interests is the focus. This might 
be achieved through training of effective communication. Training on how to 
appropriately interpret the opponents’ concerns is important for both women and 
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men. This could greatly help them to accurately estimate issuing ratings of 
opponents, and achieve mutual beneficial agreements. 
 
6.3 Limitation and Future Research 
Firstly, we focused on the homogeneous gender dyads with an assumption that these 
dyads represented extreme positions on several gender variables. However, this 
assumption might limit the generalizability of the results. To have a more complete 
understanding, it would be good to include mixed-gender dyads in future studies. 
Researchers may examine how opponents of a different gender affect the focal 
negotiator perception and behavior in NSS facilitated negotiation.  
 
Secondly, to reduce the complexity, we only studied the dyadic compositions. 
However, in real practice, it is common that there are more than one representative 
for each side in a negotiation. Hence, researchers can extend the study to larger 
group size. Thus, the situation is more complex, where researchers need to consider 
the gender composition of each side as well as the gender composition of all 
negotiation parties. Furthermore, the circumstances can be even more convoluted in 
multi-party negotiation. For example, Deal (2000) examined the three-person 
homogeneous gender groups on their intentional use of information in competitive 
negotiations. Incorporating the study of group dynamics would be a possible 
direction for future study.  
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Thirdly, a single type of NSS was used to examine the research model and hypotheses. 
Hence, the findings are not generalizable to other software. Student subjects were 
adopted in this experiment. Although it is a common practice in most NSS studies, we 
could not rule out its effects on the generalizability of our findings. It has been 
suggested that student subjects are acceptable surrogates for organizational decision 
makers (Siegel & Harnett, 1964; Gallupe, 1985). However, there are potential risks 
from lack of enthusiasm to reach agreements and relatively low accountability to 
constituents. In future studies, researchers may recruit subjects from the industry with 
a large sample size.  
 
Fourthly, in this study, we focused on negotiation strategy reflected in their speech for 
face-to-face dyads. In future studies, researchers may record negotiators’ non-verbal 
communication to explore its effect on the two strategy dimensions. 
 
Lastly, we adapted the same negotiation case from Jones’ (1988) study, such that the 
limitations of this design (Foroughi et al., 1995) were inherited. Particularly, the 
design on predetermined point structures and bottom line made the tasks to be simpler 
to the negotiators. Hence, it decreased the realism of the experimental design, but also 
increased the controlled nature of the task setting. By using the same experiment task, 
we could compare the findings among studies, and consequently accumulate 
knowledge in NSS research.  
 - 88 -
CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 
 
The central question of interest in this study is how NSS could influence the 
negotiation outcomes by investigating the mediating effect of negotiation strategy, 
with a special emphasis on gender composition. Both dimensions of negotiation 
strategy, assertiveness and cooperativeness, are important predictors of negotiation 
outcomes. While prior NSS studies were more focused on the input and output of 
negotiation, the current study made an initial attempt to integrate the descriptive and 
prescriptive perspectives in order to open the ‘black box’ by investigating strategy in 
negotiation process.  
 
Previous studies are largely focused on the system functions and structural factors, 
whereas the present study aims to investigate negotiators’ characteristics, since 
human negotiators are involved in most negotiations in real practice. The findings of 
this study provide inputs to system designers to better enhance the NSS according to 
user gender, such that negotiators can adopt more effective strategies. Despite the 
development of NSS, increasing the efficiency and utility of negotiation also means 
selecting the right people and training them to carry out what they are supposed to 
do. This study provides knowledge to managers preparing and carrying out 
successful negotiations with awareness of the gender effects.  
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APPENDIX A: Background Information of Negotiation Case 
Background Information on Buyer (Roberts Enterprise, Inc.) 
Roberts Enterprise, Inc. is a major U.S. engine manufacturer. During the last two 
quarters of 2005, total sales volume increased slightly; however, as a percent of 
market share, sales does not look good. Roberts' market share remained constant 
during the third quarter, and has dropped slightly during the fourth, despite vigorous 
sales efforts.  
  
In an effort to reverse this trend, the marketing research department has proposed 
introducing a lower priced engine, which would sell for approximately $3,000. An 
important subcomponent for this engine is the turbocharger, which Roberts can 
purchase for substantially less than they can manufacture themselves. The 
negotiation in which you are about to participate concerns the specific terms of a 
three-year contract to purchase this subcomponent.  
  
Roberts' marketing department hopes that turbocharger delivery can begin within 
five months in order to penetrate the fall, 2006 boating market. The engineering 
department estimates that $200.00/unit is a reasonable price to pay for the 
turbocharger. Marketing has advised the purchasing department that a contract that 
guarantees purchase of more than 5,000 units per year would be risky. In addition, it 
is very desirable to Roberts to obtain a full four-year warranty (parts and labor) on 
turbochargers, as they have just lengthened their engine warranty to four years.  
  
Roberts deals regularly with three major suppliers. All offer quality parts and good 
service and all have made good on all aspects of previous purchase agreements. 
Roberts is confident it can expect the same good performance in the future from 
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Background Information on Seller (Simo Parts Distributor) 
Simo Parts Distributor has enjoyed a good working relationship with Roberts 
Enterprise for several years. The company began as a small engine parts supplier, 
with pistons and connecting rods accounting for the majority of their sales. Over the 
past several years the small engine parts market has become extremely competitive 
due to the increase in foreign imports. Simo responded by expanding its product line 
to include more expensive engine subcomponents such as crankshafts and 
turbochargers. They have found they can be very competitive in this area because 
they have the technical skill to build components to buyers' specifications and can 
use existing distribution channels.  
  
Both marketing and production are in agreement that several less profitable small 
parts should be dropped from their production line in order to place more emphasis 
on the specialty subcomponent market. Simo is building a good reputation in this 
area and the company's future looks bright.  
  
When a Roberts purchasing agent first mentioned the special turbocharger to Simo's 
sales representatives, the representatives called a meeting with major department 
heads to discuss what would be--in Simo's terms-- a “fair agreement". During the 
meeting the Vice-President of production explained that a significant investment in 
research and development would be required to finalize the design of the 
turbocharger. Additionally, the company would incur set up costs and lost 
production costs on the small parts lines that would have to be converted for 
turbocharger processing. The production VP is confident, however, that the first 
shipment could be ready within eight months. They are also very willing to offer a 
full one-year warranty on parts and labor.  
  
In order to recoup costs, the production, marketing, and finance departments agree 
that the absolute minimum price they would be willing to commit to over the next 
three years is $224.00/uint. Further, they could only agree to this low price if 
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Roberts agreed to purchase a minimum of 8,000 units per year. Considering the 
quality of the product they will be delivering and the development and production 
costs they will incur, Simo considers this to be a very reasonable offer.  
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APPENDIX B: Pre-Negotiation Questionnaire 
1. My role is ________ (buyer/seller). 
2. I am going to negotiate _____________ (with/without) computer support. 
3. I will negotiate on ________ (how many) issues. 
4. The two most important issues to my company are _______and_____. 
5. How many possible alternatives are there for the final agreement? 
______________. 
6. At the end of the bargaining session, the utility score of the final contract 
agreement must be no less than _________ points. (Hint: please refer to the 
bottom line of your company.) 
7. Do you have any business negotiation experience? __ (Yes/No)   
8. Have you ever used Negotiation Support Systems or other decision support 
systems? __ (Yes/No) ---- NSS dyads only 
9. Do you personally know the person sitting in front of you? __ (Yes/No) --- 
Face-to-face dyads only 
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APPENDIX C: Post-Negotiation Questionnaire 
 
Personal Information 
Age: ______________________            Gender: _____________________                  
Faculty: ___________________             Year of Study: ________________                      
Nationality: ________________ 
 
Please circle your answers in the following questions. 
1. I am pleased with the final agreement in this negotiation. 
Not Agree             Strongly Agree 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
2. I am delighted with my own performance as a negotiator. 
Not Agree             Strongly Agree 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
3. I am happy with the number of utility points. 
Not Agree             Strongly Agree 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
4. I think the outcome of this negotiation is satisfactory for my company. 
Not Agree            Strongly Agree 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
